He abandoned the stick and barely used the carrot
As Colombia prepares for a presidential runoff, the contest has become something larger than a domestic election — a collision between competing visions of sovereignty, drug policy, and hemispheric power. President Gustavo Petro, facing a narrow deficit against far-right challenger Abelardo de la Espriella, has accused the Trump administration of abandoning partnership in favor of ideological alignment, endorsing his opponent in ways that blur the line between diplomacy and interference. The outcome will shape not only who governs Colombia, but how the world's largest cocaine-producing nation chooses to confront the crisis that has defined it for generations.
- Trump's swift, unconditional endorsement of de la Espriella — posted almost immediately after the first round — transformed a tight electoral race into an open confrontation between Bogotá and Washington.
- Petro's coca eradication numbers tell a story his rhetoric cannot fully cover: forced eradication collapsed by over 90% under his watch, while the voluntary substitution program he championed was funded at as little as 8% of its allocated budget in some years.
- Human rights groups report that organized crime has expanded in territory, membership, and violence under Petro's administration, even as he points to a stable overall homicide rate as evidence of progress.
- The 1.6 million votes cast for third-place conservative Paloma Valencia are now the decisive prize — her endorsement of de la Espriella, combined with Trump's backing, has shifted momentum toward the far-right candidate.
- Petro warns that a right-wing victory, amplified by foreign endorsement, risks igniting a wave of political violence in a country where, as he put it, hatred has historically and immediately produced deaths.
Colombia is heading into a presidential runoff that will determine not just who leads the country, but how it wages its long war on drugs — and whether Washington is a partner or an adversary in that fight. President Gustavo Petro sat down with CBS News after the first round to make his case: that the Trump administration has chosen sides on ideology rather than merit, and that the choice will backfire.
The first-round numbers were close. Far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella took 43.7 percent; leftist senator Iván Cepeda, who would extend Petro's agenda, took 40.9. Trump did not wait for nuance — he posted a "Complete and Total" endorsement of de la Espriella almost immediately, warning that the result would shape Colombia's future relationship with the United States. To Petro, this was not observation. It was interference. He accused Washington of abandoning drug cooperation to back what he called narco-paramilitary forces, pointing to Trump's past support for a Honduran president later convicted of trafficking in U.S. courts. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had already labeled Petro's government "problematic." The message, Petro said, was clear: he was the problem.
The deeper fight is over coca. Petro inherited a program that had eradicated 130,000 hectares under his predecessor; under his watch, forced eradication fell to roughly 9,000 — a drop of more than 90 percent. He defends the shift openly, arguing that forced eradication doesn't work, that the money gets stolen, and that talking to rural farming communities is more effective than bombing their fields. But the results have not matched the vision. Counternarcotics expert Daniel Mejía notes that Petro's government delayed releasing UN coca census data for over a year — the first such delay in 27 years — and that when the data emerged, it showed cultivation had risen to roughly 262,000 hectares. More damning still, the crop substitution program Petro championed was never properly funded, with budget execution as low as 8 percent in some years. "They have a different approach; that's fine," Mejía said. "But do that approach."
Meanwhile, organized crime has grown in territorial reach and violent power, even as Petro points to a stable overall homicide rate. Contract killings have increased. He blames global manipulation campaigns and Colombia's deep history of polarization for the rightward political shift, and warns that a discourse of hatred in Colombia has always, quickly, produced deaths.
The runoff will pit these realities against each other. De la Espriella has promised to resume aerial fumigation — banned since 2015 — and to adopt El Salvador-style mass-incarceration security tactics. Cepeda would deepen Petro's progressive course. The 1.6 million votes cast for third-place conservative Paloma Valencia are now the decisive variable; she has endorsed de la Espriella, though her running mate has not. Petro's argument is that by backing the right, the United States is losing a potential ally and empowering the very forces that will make the drug crisis worse. Whether Colombian voters agree will determine not just the country's next president, but how the hemisphere's largest cocaine producer chooses to face the crisis that has defined it for decades.
Colombia is heading toward a runoff election that will determine not just who leads the country, but how it wages war on drugs—and whether the United States stands with the incumbent or against him. President Gustavo Petro sat down with CBS News days after the first round of voting to make his case: that Washington, under Donald Trump, has chosen sides not on merit but on ideology, and that this choice will backfire.
The numbers from Sunday's vote were tight. Far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella captured 43.7 percent. Leftist senator Iván Cepeda, who would extend Petro's policies, took 40.9 percent. The margin was narrow enough that the runoff could go either way. But Trump did not wait for nuance. He posted his endorsement of de la Espriella almost immediately, calling it "Complete and Total" and warning that the election's outcome would shape Colombia's future relationship with the United States. To Petro, this was not election observation. It was interference.
"Our republics were founded on the principles of freedom and sovereignty," Petro told CBS News, his voice steady with the kind of anger that comes from feeling cornered. He accused Washington of abandoning cooperation on drug trafficking in favor of backing what he called narco-paramilitarism—forces complicit in the very trade America claims to oppose. He pointed to Trump's support for former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, convicted in the U.S. of trafficking. The friction, Petro said, boiled down to three things: his government is progressive, it sits on the left, and it disagrees with American policy on Gaza. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had already called Petro's government "problematic," while describing most of Latin America as filled with American allies. The message was clear. Petro was the problem.
The tension ran deep enough that Petro canceled a planned meeting with New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani during his visit to the United Nations. The mayor's office confirmed the cancellation, though it left the door open for future engagement. The withdrawal of diplomatic courtesy was its own kind of statement.
But the real fight is over drugs. Petro inherited a coca eradication program that, under his predecessor Iván Duque, had destroyed 130,000 hectares of coca plants in 2022. Petro dismantled it. Last year, forced eradication dropped to roughly 9,000 hectares—a decline of more than 90 percent. He does not hide this. Instead, he defends it. "I do not want forced eradication because it doesn't work," he told CBS News. "The money gets stolen." His alternative: talk to rural communities, offer them voluntary crop substitution, stop bombing their homes and displacing their families. "I stopped targeting peasant farmers," he said. "I started talking to them."
The problem is the results do not match the rhetoric. Daniel Mejía, a counternarcotics expert at Universidad de los Andes who has advised multiple Colombian governments, says Petro's government delayed releasing United Nations coca crop census data by more than a year—the first time in 27 years this has happened. When the data finally surfaced, it showed coca cultivation rose by at least 9,000 hectares in 2024, reaching roughly 262,000 hectares. Petro presented graphics showing a slight downward trend since then, but Mejía questions the numbers and their source. More damning: the crop substitution program Petro championed was never properly funded. Budget execution never exceeded 15 percent of allocated funds in any of the first three full years of his government. Some years it was as low as 8 percent. "They have a different approach; that's fine," Mejía said. "But do that approach." Petro abandoned the stick and barely used the carrot.
Meanwhile, the composition of violence in Colombia has shifted in ways Petro cannot fully explain away. Human rights groups have documented that organized crime groups have grown in membership, territorial control, and violent power under his administration. Contract killings have increased. Petro insists the overall homicide rate has remained stable at around 25 to 26 per 100,000 inhabitants, and he blames global manipulation campaigns and Colombia's long history of polarization for a rightward political shift. "In Colombia, hatred immediately produces deaths," he said. "Promoting a discourse of hatred is inciting a violence that could become unstoppable in this country."
The runoff will pit these visions against each other. De la Espriella, slightly favored in polls, has promised to resume aerial fumigation of coca fields—a practice banned since 2015—and to adopt security tactics modeled on El Salvador's Nayib Bukele, known for mass incarceration and aggressive gang suppression. Cepeda would deepen Petro's progressive agenda. The 1.6 million votes cast for mainstream conservative Paloma Valencia, who finished third, are now in play. She endorsed de la Espriella, though her running mate has not. Petro's argument is that by backing the right, the United States is losing a potential ally in the drug fight and instead empowering forces that will make the problem worse. Whether Colombian voters agree will determine not just the country's next president, but how the hemisphere's largest cocaine producer confronts the crisis that has defined it for decades.
Citações Notáveis
I do not want forced eradication because it doesn't work. The money gets stolen.— President Gustavo Petro, defending his shift away from aerial fumigation and forced crop destruction
In Colombia, hatred immediately produces deaths. Promoting a discourse of hatred is inciting a violence that could become unstoppable in this country.— President Gustavo Petro, warning of political violence if the right wins the runoff
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does Petro see Trump's endorsement as interference rather than just a preference?
Because it came with a warning about what the election means for U.S.-Colombia relations. That's not a casual opinion—it's a threat dressed as concern. Petro reads it as Washington saying: align with us or lose cooperation.
But isn't the U.S. allowed to have a position on who should lead a neighboring country?
Technically, yes. But Petro's point is that the U.S. is choosing sides based on ideology, not results. He's saying: you claim to care about drugs, but you're backing someone whose track record on this is untested, while abandoning me because I'm left-wing.
Is he right about the drug problem getting worse under him?
The data is messy. Coca cultivation rose in 2024, but Petro argues his approach is just beginning. The real issue is that he never funded the alternative he promised. He stopped forced eradication but didn't build the substitution program to replace it.
So he abandoned one tool without having another ready?
Exactly. And now he's caught between defending a policy that hasn't worked and blaming external forces—polarization, manipulation campaigns, American interference—for why voters might turn right.
What happens if de la Espriella wins?
He brings back aerial fumigation and adopts a much harsher security model. It's a complete reversal. The question is whether that actually reduces coca or just displaces it, and whether the violence Petro warns about becomes real.
And if Cepeda wins?
Petro's approach continues, but with the same funding problems and the same pressure from Washington. Either way, the U.S. has already signaled it prefers the other guy.