The island seizure ability will certainly be used to regain control
In the contested waters of the South China Sea, two competing visions of order are hardening into military posture. China has doubled its island-seizure exercises from the prior year, while the United States and the Philippines have moved to reinforce a security alliance that had briefly frayed. At the center of this convergence stands a small archipelagic nation navigating between a rising power and an established one, seeking clarity about who will stand beside it if the moment of confrontation arrives.
- China sealed off ocean waters near Hainan for live-fire drills, deploying transport ships, helicopters, tanks, and landing craft in exercises explicitly designed to practice seizing and holding islands.
- The pace of Chinese island-capture drills has nearly doubled year over year — twenty exercises in just the first half of 2021 — signaling a military establishment moving from preparation toward readiness.
- The United States responded not with force but with alliance-building, as Secretary Blinken publicly celebrated the Philippines' restoration of the Visiting Forces Agreement and invoked the 2016 arbitration ruling China refuses to recognize.
- Philippine Defense Secretary Lorenzana pressed Washington for sharper commitments, demanding updated treaty language that would make explicit what America would actually do if China moved against Philippine-claimed waters.
- A string of recent provocations — China's new vessel-notification regulation, the USS Benfold's passage near Mischief Reef, and Beijing's counter-drills timed to Quad exercises — has left the region in a state of managed but fragile tension.
China sealed off waters near its southern coast for live-fire naval exercises, and the footage released by state television left little to interpretation: a Type 071 transport dock deploying helicopters, a tank, and air-cushioned landing craft to put soldiers ashore on an unnamed island. The drills were part of a sharply accelerating pattern — twenty island-capture exercises in the first half of 2021 alone, nearly double the total from all of 2020. Military analysts read the signal plainly. Former PLA instructor Song Zhongping said the exercises demonstrated that China had already built sufficient air and sea superiority to act, and that the capability would eventually be used to reclaim islands Beijing considers its own.
As China drilled, the United States was publicly reaffirming its alliance with the Philippines. Secretary of State Blinken met with Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Locsin to celebrate the restoration of the Visiting Forces Agreement — a security pact that had lapsed but was now being revived as the two countries marked seventy years of their Mutual Defense Treaty. Blinken called on China to honor the 2016 arbitration ruling that had invalidated most of its territorial claims in the South China Sea, a ruling Beijing has consistently refused to recognize.
Philippine Defense Secretary Lorenzana was pushing for something more concrete. Speaking in Washington, he argued that the Mutual Defense Treaty needed updated language — clearer commitments about what the United States would actually do if China made a move in disputed waters, and language explicitly aligned with the 2016 arbitral award. The Philippines was, in effect, asking its ally to stop speaking in generalities.
The backdrop was a series of recent flashpoints: China's new regulation requiring foreign vessels to notify authorities before entering waters it claims, the USS Benfold's passage near contested Mischief Reef, and Beijing's decision to launch fresh naval exercises timed to coincide with high-profile Quad drills near Guam. President Duterte had reinstated the VFA in July after what he called a national interest assessment, and Locsin framed the move as restoring the security balance in the Asia Pacific. But the restoration also carried an implicit admission — that the Philippines could not face China's accelerating military buildup alone, and that the time for ambiguity about alliance commitments was running out.
China sealed off a stretch of ocean near its southern coast for live-fire exercises scheduled for Thursday and Friday, according to maritime authorities. The drills were designed to sharpen the Chinese navy's ability to seize and hold an island—a capability that has become the focus of an accelerating training regimen. On Wednesday morning, before the larger exercises, a naval unit under China's Southern Theatre Command had already conducted an amphibious landing operation in the South China Sea. Video released by state television showed the Wuzhishan, a Type 071 transport dock, deploying helicopters, at least one tank, and three air-cushioned landing craft to put soldiers ashore on an unnamed island. The timing was deliberate. As China drilled its island-seizure tactics, the United States was publicly celebrating a security agreement with the Philippines—a move that signaled Washington's intent to remain a counterweight to Beijing's growing military assertiveness in the region.
The numbers tell part of the story. In the first half of 2021 alone, China had conducted twenty naval exercises involving elements of island capture. That was nearly double the thirteen such drills carried out during all of 2020. Military analysts saw the pattern as unmistakable. Song Zhongping, a former People's Liberation Army instructor and military commentator based in Hong Kong, interpreted the exercises as a clear signal: China was preparing to retake islands it had lost. "The island seizure ability shown in the video reflected that the PLA has already conducted enough exercises to gain superiority in the air and at sea," Song said, "and this marine combat ability will certainly be used to regain control of some islands."
The Philippines, caught between the two powers, was moving to strengthen its hand. On Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. and expressed American satisfaction with the Philippines' decision to restore the Visiting Forces Agreement—a security pact that had been allowed to lapse but was now being revived. The agreement was a cornerstone of the alliance between the two countries, which had been marking seventy years of the Mutual Defense Treaty. Blinken emphasized the importance of freedom of navigation and respect for international law in the South China Sea, and he called on China to comply with a 2016 arbitration ruling that had found most of China's territorial claims in the waters to have no legal basis.
Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana was pushing for more. Speaking at a forum organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, he said key areas of the Mutual Defense Treaty needed updating to reflect the current security environment. He wanted clearer language about the precise scope of American commitments to Manila, and he wanted those commitments aligned with the 2016 arbitral award. The Philippines was, in effect, asking the United States to be more explicit about what it would do if China made a move in the South China Sea.
The backdrop to all this maneuvering was a series of recent incidents that had kept tensions high. In late August, China had issued a regulation requiring foreign vessels to give notice before entering what Beijing claimed as its territorial waters. Days later, the guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold sailed near Mischief Reef, a disputed feature that China claims but the Philippines and Vietnam also claim. China responded with a new round of naval exercises in late August, timed to coincide with—or perhaps to counter—a high-profile joint drill involving the United States and members of the Quad alliance off the coast of Guam.
President Rodrigo Duterte had decided to reinstate the Visiting Forces Agreement in July after what he called a thorough assessment based on national interest. For Foreign Affairs Secretary Locsin, the move was meant to restore the security balance in the Asia Pacific region and put the U.S.-Philippine relationship back on solid ground. But the agreement's restoration was also an acknowledgment of a hard reality: the Philippines could not manage the challenge posed by China's military buildup alone. The drills China was conducting, the regulations it was imposing, and the sheer scale of its naval exercises suggested that Beijing was not waiting for diplomacy. It was preparing for the possibility of taking what it believed belonged to it.
Citações Notáveis
The island seizure ability shown in the video reflected that the PLA has already conducted enough exercises to gain superiority in the air and at sea, and this marine combat ability will certainly be used to regain control of some islands.— Song Zhongping, military analyst and former PLA instructor
We are very gratified to have the recent renewal of the Visiting Forces Agreement.— U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why is China running so many of these island-seizure drills now? What's changed?
The frequency has doubled in just one year. It suggests the PLA believes it has achieved enough air and sea superiority to attempt something it couldn't before. These aren't theoretical exercises—they're practicing a specific operation.
And the Philippines is responding by tightening ties with the US. But can that agreement actually stop China if it decides to move?
That's the question Lorenzana is trying to answer by asking for clarification. Right now, the Mutual Defense Treaty is vague about what the US would actually do. He wants it spelled out.
So the Philippines is caught in the middle, asking both sides to be clearer about their intentions?
Exactly. The VFA renewal is a signal to China that Manila is choosing the US alliance. But Lorenzana's push for treaty updates is also a signal to Washington: we need you to be specific about your commitment, because we're betting our security on it.
What does the 2016 arbitration ruling actually mean if China ignores it?
It means China's claims have no legal standing under international law. But law and military capability are different things. Blinken keeps calling on China to abide by it, but China has been building military capacity instead.
Is there any chance this ends without a confrontation?
That depends on whether China believes it can take what it wants before the US-Philippine alliance becomes too costly to challenge. The drills suggest China is testing that calculation.