Even those at the highest levels remain subject to investigation and discipline.
In a nation where power and accountability have long existed in uneasy tension, China's military court has sentenced two former defence ministers — Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu — to death with a two-year reprieve for corruption, including bribery. Both men once stood at the apex of China's strategic military command, yet their convictions illustrate that under Xi Jinping's decade-long anti-corruption campaign, proximity to power offers no immunity from its reach. The verdicts extend a pattern of disciplining over one million officials, raising enduring questions about whether such campaigns serve justice, consolidate authority, or both.
- Two men who once commanded China's nuclear missile forces and sat on its most powerful military body now face death sentences — a stark signal that no rank is beyond the campaign's reach.
- The near-simultaneous fall of successive defence ministers from the same post has exposed deep institutional rot within the Rocket Force, China's strategic missile command.
- Li Shangfu's tenure lasted only months before his removal, and the unusual brevity of his time in office had already fuelled speculation about the scale of corruption being uncovered.
- Beijing is prosecuting the cases as proof that Xi's anti-corruption drive is principled and universal, even as outside observers read the purges as instruments of political consolidation.
- The death-with-reprieve sentences — a distinctive legal mechanism allowing potential commutation — leave the men alive but stripped of standing, serving as a calculated warning to the broader military establishment.
On Thursday, a Chinese military court sentenced former defence ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu to death for corruption, with a two-year reprieve that leaves open the possibility of commutation to life imprisonment. Wei was convicted of accepting bribes; Li faced the same charge with the additional count of offering them. Both had already been expelled from the Communist Party in 2024.
The two men share a striking professional arc. Wei led the People's Liberation Army's Rocket Force — the strategic missile command created in 2015 — before becoming defence minister from 2018 to 2023. Li succeeded him both at the Rocket Force and later at the defence ministry, though his ministerial tenure lasted only a matter of months before he was removed. Xi Jinping had personally selected Li for the post, making his swift downfall all the more conspicuous.
Their convictions are part of a sweeping anti-corruption campaign Xi has pursued since taking power in 2012, one that has disciplined more than one million officials across civilian and military ranks. Both Wei and Li had served on the Central Military Commission, the body Xi chairs that commands China's armed forces — making their prosecution a demonstration that even the highest echelons of military authority are not shielded from accountability, or from the political calculations that often accompany it.
The death-with-reprieve mechanism is a distinctive feature of Chinese criminal justice, theoretically allowing sentences to be reduced, though commutations remain rare. For the military establishment, the verdicts carry an unmistakable message: rank and prior service provide no protection under Xi's framework, and the Rocket Force's troubles in particular remain an unresolved concern at the heart of Beijing's defence establishment.
China's military court handed down death sentences on Thursday against two former defence ministers, Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, both convicted of corruption charges that included accepting bribes. Li faced the additional charge of offering bribes. The sentences came with a two-year reprieve—a common feature of capital punishment in China that allows for potential commutation. Both men had already been stripped of their Communist Party membership in 2024.
Wei served as defence minister from 2018 until 2023, when Li succeeded him in the role, though Li's tenure lasted only a few months before his removal. The two men shared a significant professional history: both had previously led the People's Liberation Army's Rocket Force, the military's strategic missile command that was established in 2015 as part of President Xi Jinping's broader restructuring of China's armed forces. Wei headed the Rocket Force from its creation through 2017, then moved into the defence ministry portfolio. Li, who was personally selected for the top defence post by Xi himself, never had the opportunity to establish a lengthy record in the role.
The convictions represent part of a much larger pattern within Xi's administration. Since taking power in 2012, the Chinese president has orchestrated what officials describe as a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that has resulted in the punishment of more than one million officials across civilian and military ranks. Generals and senior commanders have been particular targets of this effort. The campaign has functioned as both a stated effort to root out graft and, observers note, as a mechanism for consolidating power and removing potential rivals from positions of influence.
Both Wei and Li held seats on the Central Military Commission, the body chaired by Xi that oversees China's armed forces. Their expulsion from the party and subsequent prosecution signal that even those who operated at the highest levels of military authority remain subject to investigation and discipline. The timing and scope of their cases—particularly the removal of multiple top officials from the Rocket Force following Li's sacking—suggest that corruption within the military hierarchy remains a priority concern for Beijing's leadership.
The death sentences with reprieve are a distinctive feature of China's criminal justice system. They allow convicted individuals to remain alive during a two-year period in which their sentences could theoretically be commuted to life imprisonment, though such commutations are rare. The sentences underscore the severity with which the state treats corruption among its highest-ranking defence officials, even as they stop short of immediate execution. For the broader Chinese military establishment, the convictions serve as a reminder that rank and prior service offer no protection from prosecution under Xi's anti-corruption framework.
Citas Notables
Li was personally selected for the top defence post by Xi himself— Official reporting on Li's appointment
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why would China execute—or nearly execute—two of its own defence ministers? That seems like an extreme response to corruption.
It's not just about the corruption itself. These were men at the absolute top of the military hierarchy, with access to sensitive information and the ability to shape weapons development. When you're talking about the Rocket Force, you're talking about China's nuclear deterrent. The stakes are existential.
But Xi has been doing this for over a decade now—punishing more than a million officials. Is this really about cleaning up graft, or is it something else?
It's both. Corruption is real and corrosive. But the scale and the targeting of rivals and potential power centers suggests Xi is using the anti-corruption machinery to consolidate control. These two men were members of the Central Military Commission. They were close to power. Now they're gone.
Li only served a few months as defence minister. What could he have done in that short time?
That's the question, isn't it. The fact that he was removed so quickly, and then several other Rocket Force officials were charged after him, suggests something deeper was uncovered—or that he represented a threat that needed to be neutralized quickly.
What does this mean for the military now?
It sends a message: no one is untouchable. But it also creates uncertainty. If you're a general or a minister, you're constantly aware that an investigation could come for you at any moment. That can be paralyzing.