No rank protects you from accountability—the message is written in sentences
In Beijing this week, two former defence ministers were handed death sentences with reprieve — a verdict that places them, in all likelihood, in prison for the rest of their lives. The sentences mark the sharpest moment yet in Xi Jinping's long campaign to cleanse China's military of corruption, a campaign that has now consumed some of the most powerful figures in the People's Liberation Army. Yet as history often reminds us, the instruments of purification carry their own costs: the very institutions being reformed may be left hollowed at the moment they are needed most.
- Two former defence ministers now face what amounts to life imprisonment, their fall from the heights of Chinese military power made official by state media on Thursday.
- The purge has already consumed the Rocket Force — the unit guarding China's nuclear arsenal — and claimed a Politburo-level general once considered among Xi's closest allies.
- Investigators described the ministers' conduct in the starkest terms: vast bribes accepted, authority weaponised for personal gain, and institutional trust shattered at the command level.
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies has warned that the relentless removals are opening dangerous gaps in China's military command structure.
- Xi's twin ambitions — a corruption-free force and a modernised one — are now pulling in opposite directions, with strategic consequences that extend well beyond China's borders.
Beijing announced this week that former defence ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu had each been sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve — a legal mechanism that, in practice, converts to life imprisonment without parole if no further crimes are committed during that period. The verdicts, carried by state news agency Xinhua, represent the most dramatic moment yet in Xi Jinping's military anti-corruption campaign, which has been running since he came to power in 2012.
The purge intensified sharply in 2023, when investigators turned on the Rocket Force — the division responsible for China's nuclear and conventional missile systems — and removed a top Politburo-level general long regarded as personally close to Xi. The sentences handed down this week suggest the campaign has no intention of slowing.
Li Shangfu was found to have accepted enormous sums in bribes while also offering bribes to others, using his position to benefit himself and his associates. Wei Fenghe faced parallel charges: taking vast amounts of money and valuables, and leveraging his authority to help others gain improper advantages in personnel decisions. Xinhua described Wei's conduct as "extremely serious in nature, with a highly detrimental impact."
Beyond the individual verdicts, analysts are raising harder questions about what the purge is doing to the institution itself. The International Institute for Strategic Studies warned this year that the scale of removals has left meaningful gaps in China's command structure — gaps that may already be affecting operational readiness. The contradiction at the heart of Xi's project is now difficult to ignore: the drive to purify the military is unfolding at precisely the moment China is attempting its most ambitious military modernisation in decades, and the two imperatives are beginning to work against each other.
Beijing announced this week that two former defence ministers—Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu—had been sentenced to death, though with a two-year reprieve attached to each verdict. The sentences, reported by state news agency Xinhua on Thursday, represent the latest and most dramatic escalation in President Xi Jinping's sprawling anti-corruption campaign within China's military establishment, a purge that has now reached into the highest echelons of command.
Xi launched his broader corruption crackdown when he took power in 2012, but the armed forces have remained a persistent focus throughout. The campaign intensified markedly in 2023 when investigators turned their attention to the Rocket Force—the division responsible for overseeing both China's nuclear arsenal and its conventional missile systems. That same year, authorities removed Zhang Youxia, the top general in the People's Liberation Army and a Politburo member long regarded as close to Xi himself. The sentences handed down this week suggest the purge shows no signs of slowing.
Li Shangfu's case centered on allegations that he had accepted what investigators described as "huge sums of money" in bribes while simultaneously offering bribes to others. According to Xinhua's account of the investigation, Li failed to meet his political responsibilities and used his position to secure personal benefits for himself and his associates. Wei Fenghe faced similar charges: investigators found he had taken "a huge amount of money and valuables" as bribes and had leveraged his authority to help others obtain improper advantages in personnel decisions. Xinhua characterized Wei's conduct as "extremely serious in nature, with a highly detrimental impact and tremendous harm."
The mechanics of a death sentence with reprieve in China function as a form of conditional commutation. If the condemned person commits no further crimes during the two-year reprieve period, the sentence is automatically converted to life imprisonment. Once that conversion occurs, there is no possibility of further commutation or parole—the person remains imprisoned for life. In practical terms, both men face the prospect of spending the remainder of their lives in prison, barring an extraordinary intervention.
The scale and intensity of these purges have begun to create structural problems within China's military apparatus. The International Institute for Strategic Studies warned this year that the ongoing removals and investigations have left serious gaps in the command structure. As China continues to modernize and expand its armed forces, these deficiencies in leadership and institutional continuity may have already begun to hamper operational readiness. The tension is stark: Xi's determination to root out corruption and consolidate control is occurring precisely when China's military is undergoing rapid technological and strategic transformation. The two imperatives—purification and modernization—are now working against each other.
Notable Quotes
Wei's actions were extremely serious in nature, with a highly detrimental impact and tremendous harm— Xinhua, reporting investigation findings
Military corruption purges are leaving serious deficiencies in command structure and have likely hampered readiness of rapidly modernising armed forces— International Institute for Strategic Studies
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why target defence ministers specifically? Couldn't Xi have simply replaced them quietly?
Because the military is where real power lives in China. If you want to consolidate control, you have to show the officer corps that no rank protects you from accountability. Public sentences send a message.
But doesn't removing senior officers weaken the military itself?
Exactly. That's the trade-off. You gain political control but lose institutional continuity. The International Institute for Strategic Studies flagged this—there are now gaps in the command structure at a moment when China is modernizing its forces.
What does a death sentence with reprieve actually mean in practice?
It's a life sentence that looks merciful on paper. If they behave for two years, it converts to life imprisonment without parole. So both men will die in prison, but the reprieve gives the appearance of restraint.
Is this campaign still ongoing?
Yes. Zhang Youxia, a Politburo member and close Xi ally, was removed earlier this year. The purge started in 2012 but accelerated dramatically in 2023 when they went after the Rocket Force—the nuclear weapons division. There's no sign it's stopping.
What does this tell us about Xi's priorities?
That loyalty and control matter more than institutional stability right now. He's willing to accept military readiness problems to ensure the officer corps answers to him, not to competing power centers.