They lost the faith and loyalty expected of senior officials
In the summer of 2024, China's Communist Party expelled two former defence ministers — Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu — from its ranks and referred them for criminal prosecution, a reckoning that reached into the innermost chambers of the People's Liberation Army. Both men had commanded China's most sensitive military assets, including its nuclear and missile forces, before ascending to the defence ministry under Xi Jinping's personal patronage. Their fall is not merely a story of individual corruption, but a recurring tremor in the long, unresolved tension between institutional loyalty and the temptations of power within closed systems of authority.
- Two of China's most trusted military figures — personally elevated by Xi Jinping — have been formally expelled from the Communist Party and face criminal trial for corruption, bribery, and manipulation of military appointments.
- Li Shangfu's months-long disappearance from public life had already unsettled observers, but the official charges now confirm a systemic rot within the very branch — the Rocket Force — that controls China's missile arsenal.
- The expulsions strip both men of their seats on the Central Military Commission, China's supreme military body, and bar them from the party's national congress — a near-total erasure of their institutional standing.
- This purge is the latest surge in a wave that has swept dozens of senior generals from power since 2012, with the military procurement sector proving especially fertile ground for graft.
- The cascade of high-profile dismissals raises a question Beijing cannot easily answer: if Xi's own chosen ministers prove corrupt, what does that reveal about the system's capacity to know itself?
In June 2024, China's Communist Party expelled former defence ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu and moved to prosecute them criminally — a dramatic reckoning that struck at the heart of the military establishment Xi Jinping has spent over a decade reshaping.
Both men were generals who had commanded China's most sensitive forces. Wei led the PLA's nuclear artillery corps before overseeing its transformation into the Rocket Force in 2015, then served as defence minister until 2023. Li, an aerospace engineer by training, commanded the Rocket Force before Xi personally selected him as Wei's successor — a mark of exceptional trust. Yet Li barely lasted months in the role before vanishing from public view, setting off quiet alarms in Beijing.
When the party finally announced their expulsions, the charges were sweeping: serious violations of party discipline, manipulation of personnel appointments, abuse of office, and acceptance of substantial bribes. Wei's conduct was described as causing 'tremendous harm.' Both men were stripped of their positions on the Central Military Commission and barred from the party congress. Their cases were forwarded to military prosecutors for formal criminal proceedings.
The purge did not arrive in isolation. Since Xi assumed power in 2012, dozens of senior generals have been removed on corruption charges. In late 2023 alone, nine generals — including Rocket Force and Air Force commanders — were dismissed. The military procurement sector, where Li spent much of his career, has proven especially vulnerable to graft.
For months, Wei's fate had seemed uncertain, with some reports suggesting he might escape serious consequence. The party's announcement ended that ambiguity. What remains unresolved is the deeper question the purge forces into view: if men chosen by Xi himself for the nation's highest military offices could fall so completely, the stability of the selection process — and the system behind it — is left quietly, uncomfortably in doubt.
In June 2024, China's Communist Party took the extraordinary step of expelling two former defence ministers and moving toward criminal prosecution—a reckoning that struck at the heart of the military establishment under Xi Jinping's leadership. The two men, Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, both generals in their sixties and seventies, had occupied some of the most sensitive positions in the Chinese state. Wei had served as defence minister from 2018 to 2023. Li, his successor, barely lasted a few months in the role before vanishing from public view.
Li's disappearance last year had set off quiet alarms in Beijing's corridors of power. He was no ordinary officer—an aerospace engineer by training, he had commanded the People's Liberation Army's Rocket Force, the branch responsible for China's missile arsenal. Xi himself had personally selected him for the defence ministry, a mark of trust that made his sudden absence all the more conspicuous. When the party finally announced his expulsion, the charges were stark: serious violations of party discipline and law, improper manipulation of personnel appointments, abuse of office to secure benefits for others, and acceptance of substantial sums of money and valuables in exchange for favors.
Wei faced similar accusations. The investigation into his conduct found that he had gravely violated party discipline and engaged in corruption. Both men, the party declared, had lost the faith and loyalty expected of senior officials. Their actions had poisoned the military's political environment and damaged the party's reputation, the development of national defence, and the standing of senior leadership itself. The party's language was unsparing: Wei's violations were described as "extremely serious" with "tremendous harm."
This expulsion marked a watershed moment. It was not merely a personnel shuffle or a quiet reassignment. The party moved to strip both men of their positions as State Councillors and members of the Central Military Commission, the supreme military body headed by Xi. They were also barred from serving as delegates to the party's national congress. The cases were forwarded to military procuratorial organs for criminal examination and prosecution—a formal step toward trial.
The purge of these two defence ministers was part of a much larger convulsion within the People's Liberation Army. Since Xi took power in 2012, dozens of senior generals had been sacked or punished on corruption charges. In December of the previous year, nine generals—including commanders of the Rocket Force and Air Force, as well as officials from the Central Military Commission's Equipment Development Department—had been stripped of their positions. Li himself had spent decades in the equipment department, which oversees military procurement, a sector historically vulnerable to graft.
Wei's trajectory had been similarly entangled with China's nuclear capabilities. In 2012, he took command of the PLA's Second Artillery Corps, the branch responsible for the country's nuclear arsenal. When that unit was restructured and renamed the Rocket Force in 2015, Wei remained at its helm. His long tenure in such a sensitive position made his fall all the more significant.
The timing was also notable. For months, Wei's fate had been uncertain. Media reports from the previous month had suggested he might be politically safe, citing his appearance in tributes to a deceased senior legislator. But the party's announcement dispelled any such hope. The machinery of investigation had been grinding away, and the verdict was now public.
This cascade of expulsions and prosecutions raised uncomfortable questions about how Xi's government selected officials for its most critical posts. The sudden removals and summary dismissals of senior officers sent tremors through China's bureaucracy. If men chosen by Xi himself for the defence ministry could fall so dramatically, what did that say about the stability of the system or the judgment of those at the top? The answer, for now, remained locked within the party's inner councils.
Citas Notables
Their actions failed the trust of the Party Central Committee and the CMC, and severely contaminated the political environment of the military— Communist Party announcement via Xinhua news agency
Wei's violations are extremely serious, with a highly detrimental impact and tremendous harm— Investigation findings reported by Xinhua
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does it matter that these were defence ministers specifically, rather than any other senior officials?
Because they controlled the military—the Rocket Force, nuclear weapons, personnel decisions that ripple through the entire armed forces. When your defence ministers fall on corruption charges, you're not just losing administrators. You're signaling instability at the very top of the security apparatus.
Li Shangfu was personally picked by Xi. Doesn't that make this embarrassing for Xi himself?
It does, which is probably why the party's language is so harsh about Li's conduct. By emphasizing how badly he violated discipline and betrayed the trust placed in him, the narrative shifts from "Xi made a bad choice" to "Li was corrupt despite Xi's trust." It's damage control.
The source mentions three ministers disappeared in 2023. What does that pattern suggest?
It suggests investigations were running in parallel, quietly, before any public announcement. The disappearances weren't accidents—they were the moment the machinery engaged. By the time the expulsion came, the verdict was already decided.
How does this fit into Xi's broader anti-corruption campaign?
It's the continuation of a twelve-year purge. Dozens of generals have fallen since 2012. But expelling two defence ministers and moving toward prosecution is different in scale and visibility. It sends a message that no one is untouchable, not even those Xi personally elevated.
What about the equipment department—why is that mentioned so often?
Military procurement is where money moves. It's where contracts are awarded, where officials can extract bribes, where corruption takes concrete form. Both men had connections to that world, which is probably where the money and valuables came from.