The rules became a cage when people needed shelter today
In the shadow of war and pandemic, the European Commission quietly rewrote the rules governing how member states may spend EU funds — an act of institutional flexibility in response to human necessity. Nations across Central and Eastern Europe, caught between the unfinished work of recovery and the immediate weight of mass displacement, were granted greater freedom to redirect resources, raise cofinancing ceilings, and move money without the usual bureaucratic ceremony. The decision acknowledges what rigid systems often resist: that crises do not wait for procedures, and that solidarity sometimes requires loosening the architecture built to contain it.
- Central and Eastern European nations are simultaneously managing pandemic recovery shortfalls and the fiscal shock of absorbing hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees — a double burden straining public budgets to their limits.
- Countries like Hungary and Slovakia had already failed to spend more than 57 percent of their allocated EU funds, revealing deep structural difficulties in project execution even before the war added new pressure.
- The Commission's rule changes allow member states to increase project financing, shift funds between priorities with less friction, and access cofinancing rates of up to 100 percent for refugee integration programs — backdated to the first day of the invasion.
- Portugal signals it will use the new flexibilities to reprogram Portugal 2020 funds and deploy REACT-EU resources toward Ukrainian beneficiaries, while reactivating a suspended recovery fund to accelerate project closure.
- Despite the tools now being in place, Portuguese officials have not yet identified which specific programs will be reprogrammed — the decisions about where money will actually flow remain unresolved.
In late November 2022, the European Commission relaxed the rules governing how EU member states could spend their allocated funds — a measured but consequential response to the compounding pressures of war and pandemic. Countries across Central and Eastern Europe were struggling on two fronts: still working through unspent allocations from the 2014–2020 programming period while simultaneously absorbing a continuous flow of Ukrainian refugees fleeing Russian aggression.
The scale of the execution problem was striking. Among countries with budgets exceeding seven billion euros, none had spent more than 77 percent of their funds. Hungary and Slovakia had absorbed only 56 and 57 percent respectively. Layered on top of this were the immediate costs of the war: refugee housing and integration, labor shortages, supply chain disruptions, and surging energy prices — circumstances the Commission formally recognized as exceptional.
The new rules gave member states meaningful room to maneuver. Cofinancing rates for socioeconomic integration programs could now reach 100 percent, removing a barrier that had previously limited support for displaced persons. The Commission established unit costs for basic needs, simplifying refugee funding, and set February 24, 2022 — the day the invasion began — as the eligibility date for related operations. The ceiling for reallocating funds between priorities was also raised from 10 to 15 percent, reducing the need for formal approval from Brussels.
Portugal moved to take advantage of these changes, signaling plans to reprogram Portugal 2020 funds and direct REACT-EU resources toward Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection. A suspended pandemic-era recovery fund was reactivated to accelerate project monitoring and prepare for program closure.
Still, the government stopped short of specifying which programs would actually be reprogrammed. Officials indicated that cleanup and closure work had to come first — only then would reprogramming needs be identified. The architecture of flexibility was in place; the decisions about where it would lead remained ahead.
In late November 2022, the European Commission made a quiet but significant move: it loosened the rules governing how member states could spend European Union funds. The decision came as countries across Central and Eastern Europe found themselves caught between two crises at once—still recovering from the pandemic while absorbing a continuous flow of people fleeing Russian aggression in Ukraine.
The regulation change was designed to give these countries breathing room. Member states could now increase financing for certain projects and shift money between priorities with far less bureaucratic friction than before. The Commission had identified a genuine problem: nations like Hungary, Slovakia, and others had struggled to execute their existing funding allocations. Among countries with budgets exceeding seven billion euros, none had managed to spend more than 77 percent of their allotted funds from the 2014-2020 programming period. Two countries had absorbed barely half—Hungary and Slovakia each received only 56 and 57 percent respectively.
But the real pressure came from the war itself. Central and Eastern European states were not simply dealing with slow project execution. They faced an immediate fiscal crisis: the cost of housing, feeding, and integrating hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees; simultaneous labor shortages that disrupted their own economies; supply chain breakdowns; and energy prices that had spiraled upward. These cascading problems, the Commission acknowledged, created "exceptional circumstances" that required targeted intervention.
The new rules addressed this directly. Countries could now mobilize additional resources more quickly to cover the immediate budgetary costs of supporting displaced persons. The Commission established unit costs for basic needs and protection, making it easier to fund refugee support without endless case-by-case justification. More significantly, programs aimed at the socioeconomic integration of third-country nationals—including those fleeing Russian aggression—could now receive cofinancing rates of up to 100 percent, removing a financial barrier that had previously existed. The Commission set February 24, 2022, as the eligibility date for operations responding to migration challenges caused by the invasion, effectively backdating support to the moment the war began.
To reduce administrative burden, the Commission also eliminated the requirement that program changes be formally approved only through transfers between thematic objectives within a single fund and region type. And it raised the flexibility ceiling for reallocating funds between priorities during the 2014-2020 program closure from 10 percent to 15 percent. This last change was particularly important for Portugal, which could now move larger sums between priorities without seeking formal approval from Brussels—a significant expansion of managerial discretion.
Portugal's government, preparing its 2023 budget proposal for parliamentary vote, signaled it would use these new flexibilities. Officials indicated plans to reprogram Portugal 2020 funds in light of the Commission's changes, and to deploy the second tranche of the REACT-EU initiative with specific support for Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection. To accelerate execution and prepare for proper program closure, Portugal reactivated a recovery fund that had been suspended during the pandemic, allowing closer project monitoring while maintaining safeguards against overbooking.
Yet the government remained cautious about which specific programs would actually be reprogrammed. When asked which projects had been identified as genuinely needing reallocation, officials declined to specify. "Cleanup and closure work is underway," a spokesperson from the planning ministry said, "and only after that work is complete will we identify reprogramming needs for each operational program, within the flexibilities the Commission has now permitted." The message was clear: the rules had changed, the tools were in place, but the actual decisions about where money would flow remained ahead.
Citas Notables
These circumstances created an exceptional situation that must be addressed through specific and well-targeted measures— European Parliament and Council, in the published regulation
Cleanup and closure work is underway, and only after that will we identify reprogramming needs for each operational program— Portuguese planning ministry official
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why did Brussels feel it needed to loosen these rules now, specifically?
Because the countries most affected—Poland, Hungary, the Baltics—were already struggling to spend their allocated funds before the war even started. Then suddenly they're absorbing hundreds of thousands of refugees, their energy costs are exploding, and their labor markets are disrupted. The old rules became a cage.
But couldn't they have just asked for exceptions case by case?
Technically yes, but that takes time. When you have people arriving daily who need shelter and food, you can't wait months for Brussels to approve a formal amendment. The Commission essentially said: we're going to trust you more, move faster.
The 15 percent flexibility increase—that sounds small. Why does it matter?
It's the difference between needing Brussels's permission and not. If you can move 15 percent of funds between priorities without formal approval, you've got real discretion. You can respond to what's actually happening on the ground.
What about countries like Portugal that weren't directly hit by the refugee crisis?
They get the same tools, but the pressure is different. Portugal's problem was execution—they hadn't spent their money fast enough. These new rules give them more ways to redirect funds to projects that can actually move.
So this is really about admitting the old system didn't work?
Not just admitting it—acting on it. The Commission looked at the data, saw that Hungary had only spent 56 percent of its allocation, and realized the rules themselves were part of the problem. The war just made that failure impossible to ignore.