The cost of indecision produces nothing in return
Em algum ponto entre a construção e o abandono, o Brasil deixou uma usina nuclear parcialmente erguida consumir bilhões sem gerar um único watt. Alessandro Facure, diretor da autoridade nuclear brasileira, trouxe à tona uma verdade incômoda: a indecisão tem um preço tão real quanto qualquer investimento, e esse preço cresce a cada mês de silêncio político. A questão de Angra 3 já não é apenas técnica ou econômica — é um teste sobre se o país consegue traduzir visão estratégica em vontade coletiva.
- R$2 bilhões já foram gastos sem que um único quilowatt tenha sido gerado — o TCU confirmou o desperdício causado pela ausência de uma decisão clara do governo federal.
- A usina permanece como uma estrutura incompleta no litoral fluminense, símbolo de uma paralisia burocrática que se arrasta enquanto os custos se acumulam silenciosamente.
- Concluir Angra 3 exigiria R$23,9 bilhões segundo o BNDES — um valor que intimida, mas que Facure defende como justificável diante das demandas energéticas que se aproximam.
- Centros de dados de inteligência artificial, a transição para baixo carbono e a instabilidade geopolítica global pressionam o Brasil a garantir uma fonte elétrica firme e limpa — e o tempo para decidir está se esgotando.
- A decisão final cabe ao CNPE, não à ANSN — mas Facure deixou claro que cada mês de omissão transforma o custo da indecisão em prejuízo irreversível para o país.
Alessandro Facure, diretor da Autoridade Nacional de Segurança Nuclear, concedeu entrevista ao programa Alta Voltagem, da CNN Infra, para falar sobre um problema que drena silenciosamente os cofres públicos há anos: Angra 3, usina nuclear parcialmente construída e presa num limbo entre a conclusão e o abandono. Sua mensagem foi direta — a indecisão tem custo, e esse custo não retorna nada ao país.
O Tribunal de Contas da União calculou que a falta de definição do governo federal já desperdiçou cerca de R$2 bilhões. Para concluir a obra, o BNDES estima que seriam necessários R$23,9 bilhões — uma cifra que explica parte da hesitação política, mas que Facure defende como estrategicamente justificável.
O diretor foi cuidadoso ao delimitar papéis: cabe ao CNPE, o conselho nacional de política energética, decidir o destino da usina. À ANSN compete garantir que, se construída, Angra 3 atenda aos mais rigorosos padrões de segurança. Mas Facure não escondeu sua posição: energia nuclear é um ativo estratégico, não um resquício do passado.
Seu argumento se apoia em três eixos. Usinas nucleares geram eletricidade de forma contínua, independentemente do clima — ao contrário de fontes solar e eólica. Emitem praticamente zero carbono, o que importa numa transição energética global. E, talvez mais urgente, a explosão dos centros de dados de inteligência artificial vai demandar volumes imensos de energia limpa e confiável.
Há ainda uma dimensão geopolítica: num mundo onde independência energética e credenciais de baixo carbono conferem peso diplomático, abandonar Angra 3 seria, na visão de Facure, não apenas uma perda econômica, mas uma falha de visão estratégica. O Brasil já opera Angra 1 e Angra 2 com segurança há décadas — a capacidade técnica existe. O que falta é decisão política.
Alessandro Facure, who leads Brazil's nuclear safety authority, sat down recently to talk about a problem that has been quietly draining the country's budget for years: the Angra 3 nuclear plant, frozen in an indefinite state between completion and abandonment. He was direct about what the limbo costs. Every year the government delays deciding whether to finish the plant or walk away, Brazil accumulates expenses that vanish into nothing—no electricity generated, no infrastructure built, no return on the money spent. "What becomes clear," Facure said in an interview with CNN Infra's Alta Voltagem program, "is that the cost of indecision—whether to resume or give up—creates a cost to the country that produces nothing in return."
The numbers behind that indecision are substantial. Brazil's federal audit court, the TCU, calculated that the government's failure to commit one way or the other has already wasted roughly R$2 billion. The plant sits partially constructed, a monument to bureaucratic paralysis. The BNDES, the national development bank, has updated its estimates for what it would take to actually finish Angra 3: R$23.9 billion. That is a serious sum, and it explains some of the hesitation. But Facure argued the investment makes sense when you step back and look at Brazil's energy future.
He was careful to note that his agency, the ANSN, does not make the decision about whether Angra 3 moves forward. That power sits with the CNPE, the national energy policy council. The ANSN's role is narrower and more technical: if the plant does get built, Facure promised it will meet the most stringent safety standards. But he made clear his own view. Nuclear energy, he argued, is not a luxury or a relic. It is a strategic asset for a country trying to secure its power supply and navigate the energy transition at the same time.
The case Facure laid out rests on three pillars. First, nuclear plants produce steady, reliable electricity—they run day and night, unlike solar and wind farms that depend on weather. Second, they emit almost no carbon, which matters as the world moves away from fossil fuels and Brazil tries to maintain its image as an environmentally responsible nation. Third, and perhaps most urgent in Facure's mind, the demands on Brazil's electrical grid are about to spike. Artificial intelligence data centers, he noted, will consume enormous amounts of power. A country without enough reliable, clean electricity will fall behind.
The geopolitical dimension matters too. Facure framed nuclear energy not just as a domestic infrastructure question but as part of Brazil's standing in a world where energy independence and low-carbon credentials carry weight. The country has the technical capacity to operate nuclear plants safely—it has done so at Angra 1 and Angra 2 for decades. Walking away from Angra 3, in this view, is not just a missed economic opportunity. It is a failure of strategic vision.
Yet the decision remains unmade. The R$2 billion already lost sits in the past, irretrievable. The R$23.9 billion question hangs over the future. Facure's warning is that every month of delay adds to the irreversible cost—not just in money, but in the opportunity cost of a power source Brazil may desperately need. The conversation has shifted from whether Angra 3 is technically feasible to whether the country has the political will to commit.
Citas Notables
The cost of indecision—whether to resume or give up—creates a cost to the country that produces nothing in return.— Alessandro Facure, director of Brazil's nuclear safety authority
Angra 3 will only function if it meets the most rigorous safety standards.— Alessandro Facure
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
When Facure says the cost of indecision is irreversible, what exactly does he mean? The money is already spent—how is it irreversible?
He means that once you've spent R$2 billion on a half-built plant, you can't get that money back no matter what you decide next. If you finish it, you're adding R$23.9 billion on top of a sunk cost. If you abandon it, the R$2 billion vanishes with nothing to show. Either way, that money is gone forever.
But doesn't the ANSN actually have power here? Facure runs the nuclear authority. Why is he saying the decision is out of his hands?
Because safety approval and policy approval are different things. The ANSN certifies that a plant is safe to operate. The CNPE decides whether the country should build it in the first place. Facure can guarantee the technical side, but he can't force the political decision.
He mentions AI data centers needing power. Is that a real constraint Brazil is facing, or is he making a case for nuclear?
Both. AI infrastructure does consume enormous electricity. But Facure is also using it as an argument—he's saying Brazil needs to think ahead about what its grid will look like in five or ten years, and nuclear is one answer to that.
The TCU found R$2 billion wasted. Who is responsible for that waste? Is it the government's fault for not deciding, or someone else's?
The audit points to the federal government's indecision. No one is actively stealing the money or mismanaging it in the traditional sense. The waste is structural—it's the cost of keeping a project in limbo, paying to maintain it, paying contractors, paying for studies, but never actually building anything.
If Angra 3 is so strategically important, why hasn't the government just decided to finish it?
Politics. It's expensive, it's controversial, and there are competing visions for Brazil's energy future. Some people prefer renewables like wind and solar. Some worry about nuclear waste. Some question whether the money could be better spent elsewhere. Facure is making the case that those concerns are outweighed by the strategic need, but that case hasn't won yet.