No health monitoring program existed for exposed personnel
In the quiet accounting of institutional responsibility, Botswana's Defence Force commander stood before a parliamentary committee and admitted what had long been true: soldiers had been living and working inside buildings threaded with asbestos, at two military camps, for years. The pledge to relocate personnel and dismantle the structures within three years carries the weight of a belated reckoning — one complicated by absent funding, no foreign contractor yet engaged, and no health monitoring program for those already exposed. It is a story as old as institutions themselves: the hazard was known, the cost was calculable, and still the remediation waited.
- Soldiers at Paje and Pandamatenga Base Camps have been breathing in a known carcinogen inside their own accommodation and offices, with no dedicated health surveillance to track the damage already done.
- The P41 million price tag for safe removal is real and acknowledged, yet the project was not budgeted for the current financial year — leaving the hazard funded only by hope for the next cycle.
- No local contractor in Botswana is equipped to handle asbestos disposal safely, meaning a foreign company must be sourced before any physical remediation can even begin.
- The BDF's commitment to relocate personnel by next year addresses ongoing exposure but leaves the question of past harm — years of it — largely unanswered and unmonitored.
- Amid asbestos camps, stadium renovation disputes, a costly concluded peacekeeping mission in Mozambique, and questions about air base sovereignty, the Defence Force is navigating multiple institutional crises on a constrained budget simultaneously.
On a Tuesday in late June, General Mpho Mophuting appeared before Botswana's Public Accounts Committee with an uncomfortable admission: the Defence Force had been housing and working its personnel in asbestos-contaminated buildings at two camps — Paje and Pandamatenga. The commitment he offered was structured in phases: relocate people by next year, then spend the following two years dismantling and disposing of the structures. The outline sounded orderly. The details beneath it did not.
Safe asbestos removal carries a price of approximately P41 million and demands specialized handling — once disturbed, the material becomes an acute respiratory threat. No local contractor exists with the capacity to manage it; a foreign company would be required. Yet despite the known hazard and the clear cost, the project had not been funded for the current financial year. Mophuting expressed hope it would appear in the next budget cycle.
When committee members asked whether the army had been monitoring the health of personnel exposed to asbestos over the years, the answer was no. General wellness processes existed for all staff, but nothing targeted the specific carcinogen these soldiers had been breathing. Mophuting acknowledged the gap and suggested the army might consider improving health surveillance going forward — a formulation that left years of prior exposure largely unaddressed. Pandamatenga, he noted, was used only temporarily, offering some mitigation. Paje remained active, meaning exposure was still ongoing.
The asbestos issue was not the BDF's only institutional strain. Renovation delays at SSKB Stadium, a disputed Data Centre handover, and the P674 million cost of Botswana's participation in the SADC peacekeeping mission in Mozambique — an operation the country funded independently, unlike previous AU or UN-backed engagements — all pointed to an institution managing compounding pressures with limited means. Mophuting also took time to formally deny circulating claims that Thebephatswa Air Base was American property, clarifying that Botswana had built and financed the facility, and that hosting joint training exercises did not constitute foreign ownership.
The Commander's testimony was, in its way, a portrait of deferred accountability — hazards named, timelines offered, funding absent, and the health of those already exposed left as a question for another day.
General Mpho Mophuting stood before Botswana's Public Accounts Committee on a Tuesday in late June with an uncomfortable acknowledgment: the country's Defence Force had been housing and working its personnel in buildings laced with asbestos. The two camps in question—Paje and Pandamatenga—contained structures that posed a known health hazard to the soldiers and staff who occupied them daily.
The Commander's commitment was clear enough in its outline: move people out of the contaminated buildings by next year, then spend the following two years dismantling and safely disposing of the structures themselves. The timeline sounded orderly, almost reassuring. But the details underneath told a different story—one of delayed action, constrained resources, and an absence of safeguards for those already exposed.
The cost alone underscored the complexity of the problem. Safe asbestos removal would run approximately P41 million, a figure that reflected not just the material expense but the specialized methodology required to handle a substance that, once disturbed, becomes a respiratory threat. The BDF had no local contractor capable of managing the work; a foreign company would need to be brought in. Yet despite the known hazard and the clear price tag, the project had not been budgeted for the current financial year. Mophuting expressed hope it would be funded in the next cycle, but hope is not a remediation plan.
When committee members pressed him on health monitoring—whether the army had been tracking the medical status of personnel exposed to asbestos over however many years they had occupied these camps—the answer was no. There was no dedicated health surveillance program for asbestos exposure. The army had general health and wellness processes for all staff, but nothing specific to the known carcinogen these soldiers had been breathing. Mophuting acknowledged the gap and suggested the army might consider improving health monitoring going forward, a formulation that left the question of past exposure largely unaddressed.
Pandamatenga Base Camp, he noted, was used only temporarily by personnel during trips, which offered some small mitigation. But Paje remained an active facility, meaning the exposure was ongoing. The Commander's statement that relocation would happen by next year was a commitment to stop the bleeding, not to treat the wound already inflicted.
The asbestos camps were not the only infrastructure problem the BDF faced. The Commander also reported delays and cost overruns on the renovation of SSKB Stadium and construction of a Data Centre, both projects hampered by contractual disputes and handover delays. These were separate headaches, but they painted a picture of an institution managing multiple crises simultaneously with limited resources.
In a separate matter, Mophuting addressed claims that Thebephatswa Air Base belonged to the United States. He dismissed the assertion as baseless, noting that Botswana had built the facility and maintained records of its financing. The base had hosted joint military training exercises with various countries, including SADC partners, but that collaborative use did not make it foreign property. The clarification suggested that questions about the base's sovereignty had circulated enough to warrant a formal denial.
The broader context of the BDF's financial strain emerged when Mophuting detailed the cost of Botswana's participation in the SADC peacekeeping mission in Mozambique: approximately P674 million. Unlike previous regional engagements where the African Union or United Nations had borne expenses, this operation required individual countries to fund their own contingents. The mission had proven more complex than anticipated—dealing with armed insurgents rather than conventional military opponents—and as of the Commander's testimony, no BDF soldiers remained deployed there. The expense had been substantial for a mission that had already concluded.
Notable Quotes
Priority is to have people move out of the asbestos structures by next year and accommodate them elsewhere— General Mpho Mophuting, BDF Commander
No such programme existed, except for the established health and wellness processes for all army staff— General Mpho Mophuting, on health monitoring for asbestos-exposed personnel
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
So the Defence Force has known about asbestos in these camps. How long have soldiers been living in these buildings?
The testimony doesn't specify how long the exposure has been happening. That's actually one of the troubling gaps—there's no record of health monitoring, so nobody seems to know the full scope of who was exposed or for how long.
And now they're saying they'll move people out by next year. That sounds fast.
It is, relatively. But the full removal of the asbestos itself won't happen until three years from now. So you're looking at a situation where people leave the buildings, but the contaminated structures stay standing for another two years after that.
Why does it cost so much—P41 million?
Asbestos disposal isn't like regular demolition. You can't just tear it down. The fibers become airborne and dangerous if you do that. You need specialized equipment, trained workers, and careful containment. That's why they need a foreign contractor. No local company has the expertise.
What about the people who've already been exposed?
That's the real gap. There's no health monitoring program for them. The Commander said the army might consider improving wellness surveillance, but that's future tense. For the people who've already breathed asbestos dust, there's nothing in place to track whether they develop respiratory disease or cancer down the line.
Is this a funding problem or a priority problem?
Both. The project wasn't even budgeted for this year because of fiscal constraints. But even if money had been available, the fact that no health monitoring existed suggests this wasn't treated as urgent until it became public enough to reach the committee.
What does the timeline actually mean for soldiers right now?
They stay in the contaminated buildings for at least another year. Then they move out, but the asbestos remains on the base for two more years after that. It's a slow process, and the people who've already been exposed are essentially on their own.