More permission for violence, and an environment where people can go to violence with little or no warning
On a December evening in Bondi Beach, two gunmen opened fire on a Hanukkah celebration in thirty seconds of violence that killed fifteen people and wounded three officers — a tragedy now being examined by a royal commission asking not only what happened, but what the shape of our preparedness reveals about us. The inquiry surfaces a quiet tension at the heart of modern security: that the threats most likely to arrive are precisely those that leave the least warning, and that the systems built to protect us may have been quietly reoriented away from the dangers that matter most. Australia now sits at the upper end of probable for terrorism, in an environment its own intelligence chief describes as growing hotter — a reckoning not just with one night, but with the choices made in the years before it.
- Two gunmen killed fifteen people at a Jewish community celebration in under thirty seconds — a violence so compressed that even officers already on the scene were shot before they could respond.
- A Jewish security organisation had explicitly requested a continuous police presence at the event; NSW police declined, offering intermittent mobile patrols instead — a decision now at the centre of the commission's scrutiny.
- ASIO's director general defended the agency's resourcing even as evidence emerged that counter-terrorism funding had been quietly reduced as a proportion of the overall budget, with staff redirected toward foreign interference and espionage.
- The agency had already identified an 'enduring threat to Jewish interests' and documented a sharp escalation in antisemitic violence through 2023 and 2024, yet the structural rebalancing continued.
- Australia's terrorism threat level now sits at the upper end of probable, with officials warning of an environment where lone actors can move toward violence with little or no detectable warning — the precise conditions that made December 14 possible.
On the evening of December 14, two gunmen took up position on a footbridge above Archer Park at Bondi Beach and opened fire on a Hanukkah celebration below. Within thirty seconds, eleven people had been shot. Ten died immediately; fifteen in total would not survive. The attack was over almost before any response could begin.
A royal commission examining antisemitism and social cohesion in Australia is now hearing evidence about that night and the conditions that preceded it. Among the most pointed revelations: the Community Security Group, a Jewish organisation, had asked NSW police to maintain a continuous officer presence throughout the event. Police declined, opting instead for intermittent mobile patrols. Four officers happened to be at the park when the shooting began — three were wounded. Within eight minutes, one gunman was dead and the other in custody. The two men, Sajid Akram and his son Naveed, are believed to have been inspired by Islamic State ideology. Naveed now faces fifteen counts of murder and one count of committing a terrorist act.
Counsel assisting the commission noted that no intelligence agency had prior warning of the attack — it was, in the formal sense, a surprise. But the inquiry is pressing on a deeper question: whether the broader system was adequately oriented toward threats it could not see coming.
ASIO director general Mike Burgess testified that the agency's resources were sufficient, even as evidence revealed that counter-terrorism's share of ASIO's budget had actually shrunk in recent years, with staff redirected toward foreign interference and espionage. This rebalancing occurred even as ASIO had formally identified an enduring threat to Jewish Australians and documented a sharp rise in antisemitic incidents — culminating, from October 2024, in direct targeting of individuals, businesses, and places of worship.
Burgess acknowledged that the Gaza conflict had coincided with measurable increases in antisemitic violence, and described the current threat environment as 'hotter' than when the terrorism threat level was raised to 'probable' in 2024. It now sits at the upper end of that designation — meaning a greater than fifty percent likelihood that someone will plan and attempt an attack. The next level, 'expected,' requires specific intelligence of an actual plan. December 14 is a reminder of how rarely that foreknowledge arrives.
On the evening of December 14, two gunmen positioned themselves on a footbridge overlooking Archer Park at Bondi Beach and opened fire on a Hanukkah celebration below. In the thirty seconds that followed, they shot eleven people. Ten of them died. The attack was over almost before it had begun—a violence so compressed, so sudden, that the ordinary mechanisms of response had barely time to activate.
A royal commission examining antisemitism and social cohesion in Australia began hearing evidence this week about what happened that night and what might have prevented it. The facts emerging are precise and troubling. The Community Security Group, a Jewish organization, had asked NSW police to station officers continuously throughout the Chanukah by the Sea event. Police declined. Instead, they arranged what they called a "mobile tasking"—officers would patrol the area intermittently during the evening, dropping in from time to time. When the shooting started, four police officers happened to be at Archer Park. Three of them were shot and wounded. Within five minutes, eleven officers were on scene. Within seven minutes and forty-one seconds, one gunman was dead and the other was apprehended.
The two shooters were identified as Sajid Akram and his son Naveed. Sajid was killed by police fire. Naveed, wounded and captured, now faces fifteen counts of murder and one count of committing a terrorist act. Investigators believe the attack may have been inspired by Islamic State ideology. Fifteen people in total were killed—a discrepancy from the initial count that speaks to the chaos of those moments.
Counsel assisting the commission, Richard Lancaster SC, presented a crucial piece of context: there was no specific intelligence warning of an attack on the Hanukkah celebration. No intelligence agency, no law enforcement body, had actual knowledge that armed violence was coming that night. It was, in the language of security officials, a surprise attack. This fact matters because it shapes what comes next—the harder questions about whether the system itself was adequately prepared for threats it could not see coming.
Mike Burgess, the director general of ASIO, Australia's domestic intelligence agency, testified on Monday morning. He was asked directly whether, looking back, additional funding and resources would have positioned ASIO better to pursue counter-terrorism work over the preceding five years. He said no. Even pressed on whether the agency was sufficiently resourced to counter a deteriorating security environment—particularly the rising threat of lone actors who strike without warning or prior detection—Burgess maintained that ASIO's resources were adequate. He offered a familiar reassurance: if the agency needed more money, it would ask the government, and government would consider it through the budget process.
Yet the testimony also revealed a structural shift in how Australia's intelligence priorities are ordered. While ASIO's overall funding has increased in recent years, the proportion dedicated to counter-terrorism has actually decreased. Resources, including staff, have been reallocated away from counter-terrorism toward foreign interference and espionage. This rebalancing happened even as ASIO identified an "enduring threat to Jewish interests" in Australia and even as antisemitic incidents escalated sharply. The agency documented threatening and intimidating behavior against Jewish Australians through 2023 and into 2024, then a pivot in October 2024 toward direct targeting of people, businesses, and places of worship.
Burgess acknowledged that the conflict in Gaza had been "an emotive issue" and that it had coincided with a measurable rise in antisemitic violence. The national terrorism risk assessment, he told the commission, now sits at the "upper end of probable"—meaning there is greater than a 50 percent chance that someone will plan and attempt a terrorist act. He used the metaphor of temperature: the environment is "hotter" now than when the threat level was raised to probable in 2024. There is, he said, "more permission for violence," and an environment where people can move toward violence with little or no warning. The trajectory is concerning. The next level up would be "expected," but reaching that designation requires specific intelligence of an actual plan and location—the kind of foreknowledge that, as December 14 demonstrated, may not always arrive in time.
Citações Notáveis
There is no evidence that any intelligence agency or law enforcement agency had any actual knowledge or specific information to suggest that there might be an armed attack on the Hanukkah celebration at Bondi on 14 December 2025.— Richard Lancaster SC, counsel assisting the royal commission
There is more permission for violence, and an environment where people can go to violence with little or no warning means we're on the upper end of probable.— Mike Burgess, ASIO director general
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does it matter that police declined the request for continuous security presence? Couldn't the mobile patrols have been equally effective?
The timing is everything. Four officers happened to be there when the shooting started. But "happened to be" is the problem. If you're asking for static presence, you're saying: we know this is a target, and we need eyes on it constantly. Mobile patrols mean you're gambling on luck.
But the commission also heard there was no specific intelligence about a threat to that event. So how could police have known to station officers there?
That's the harder question. They couldn't have known about this specific attack. But the Community Security Group was asking for protection based on a pattern they were seeing—rising antisemitism, increasing threats. They were asking for presence as a precaution, not because of a specific tip.
So the system failed because it requires specific intelligence before it acts, but the threat came from someone who hadn't yet come to the attention of any agency?
Exactly. Burgess said it himself—the environment allows people to move toward violence with little or no warning. The system is built to respond to known threats. It struggles with the unknown ones.
And the funding shift away from counter-terrorism—is that the real problem?
It's part of it. But Burgess says resources aren't the issue. He's saying the problem is structural: you can't prevent what you don't see coming. More money might help, but it won't solve the fundamental challenge of lone actors or small cells that operate below the radar.
So what changes after this?
That's what the commission is trying to figure out. You can't station police everywhere. You can't fund your way out of surprise attacks. But you can ask whether the system is organized to take seriously the warnings that do come—like a community asking for protection because they feel targeted.