A time will come when we simply won't comply anymore
In Brazil, the federal government is quietly reviving a legal argument that would allow the National Force — a nominally cooperative federal police unit — to be deployed into any state by ministerial order alone, without a governor's consent. The Supreme Court has already rejected this interpretation nine to one, yet the conversation persists, animated by a political calculus that armed federal presence dressed as law enforcement carries less reputational cost than open military intervention. As Bolsonaro allies publicly threaten to defy judicial orders ahead of the 2022 elections, the question being asked in Brasília is no longer merely legal — it is whether the architecture of democratic constraint will hold when tested by those who built their power within it.
- The federal government is resurrecting a constitutionally discredited interpretation that would let a single minister deploy armed federal units into any state, bypassing elected governors entirely.
- The Supreme Court already struck down this exact logic in a 9-1 ruling, yet Bolsonaro allies are openly declaring that a moment is coming when court orders will simply go unenforced.
- The political infrastructure is already wired: the Justice Minister is close to the Bolsonaro family, the National Force commander is married to a Bolsonaro congressional ally, and nearly a quarter of military police enlisted ranks hold radical political sympathies.
- A 2019 deployment in Brasília — used without the local governor's consent — revealed the real application: surveilling indigenous organizers and suppressing protests against education cuts, not maintaining public order.
- With 2022 approaching and street-level political tensions rising, the fear is that this legal loophole becomes the mechanism by which federal force is turned against opposition movements, indigenous communities, and democratic dissent itself.
Inside the Brazilian federal government, officials are quietly reviving an old legal argument: that the National Force — a federal police unit designed for cooperative deployment with states — can be sent anywhere in the country on nothing more than a minister's signature, with no governor's approval required.
The political logic is deliberate. Deploying the National Force would draw less international scrutiny than sending the military. If President Bolsonaro chose to suppress what he frames as political disorder — say, protests sparked by his own electoral fraud claims — the National Force would look like law enforcement rather than a coup. The machinery is already in place: Justice Minister Anderson Torres is close to the Bolsonaro family, and the National Force commander is married to firebrand congressional ally Carla Zambelli.
The Supreme Court, however, has already ruled on exactly this question. In 2020, after then-Justice Minister André Mendonça ordered the National Force into Bahia to carry out land seizures without Governor Rui Costa's consent, the full court ratified a ruling nine to one: such deployment violates the cooperative nature of the program and conflicts with the Constitution itself.
That ruling has not quieted the conversation. In August 2021, federal deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro declared that a moment would come when Supreme Court orders simply would not be obeyed. The government's congressional leader made a similar statement months earlier. These are not fringe provocations — they are signals from within the governing coalition.
The legal opening traces to a 2013 Dilma Rousseff-era decree, ostensibly about environmental protection, that introduced contradictory language allowing National Force deployment either by gubernatorial request or by ministerial order. Sergio Moro exploited that loophole in 2019, deploying the force in Brasília without the local governor's consent during mass protests over education cuts — and later reporting revealed that National Force members had been used to surveil indigenous organizers, including Sônia Guajajara.
A 2020 survey found that 41 percent of military police enlisted ranks participated in Bolsonaro-supporting social media groups, 25 percent held radical views, and 12 percent openly advocated shutting down the Supreme Court and Congress. In states with Bolsonaro-aligned governors, deployment is simple. Everywhere else, the government is now seriously debating whether a minister can override a governor's refusal — a power whose utility becomes unmistakable if political confrontation moves from rhetoric to action.
Inside the federal government, officials are quietly reviving an old legal argument: that Brazil's National Force—a federal police unit nominally designed for cooperation with states—can be deployed anywhere in the country with nothing more than a minister's signature. No governor's approval needed. No consultation required. Just an order from above.
This interpretation has already been rejected by Brazil's Supreme Court. But that hasn't stopped the conversation. The calculus is straightforward, according to those involved in the discussions: deploying the National Force would draw less international criticism and domestic outcry than sending the military itself. If President Jair Bolsonaro decides to send armed units into a state to suppress what he calls political disorder—say, a police mutiny sparked by his own claims of electoral fraud—the National Force would look more like law enforcement than a coup.
The political machinery is already in place. Bolsonaro enjoys sympathy among a significant portion of military police officers, who form the backbone of the National Force. The current Justice Minister, Anderson Torres, is close to the Bolsonaro family. The National Force commander, Colonel Antônio Aginaldo de Oliveira from Ceará's military police, is married to Carla Zambelli, a firebrand Bolsonaro ally in Congress. The pieces fit together neatly.
But the Supreme Court has already spoken. In September 2020, Justice Minister André Mendonça ordered the National Force into Bahia to carry out land seizures in settlement areas. Governor Rui Costa challenged the deployment. Justice Edson Fachin ruled in Costa's favor, ordering the force withdrawn from the cities of Prado and Mucuri. Three weeks later, the full court ratified that decision nine to one. The ruling was unambiguous: the decree authorizing National Force deployment without gubernatorial consent violates the program's cooperative nature and conflicts with the Constitution itself.
Yet Bolsonaro's allies have begun openly threatening to ignore Supreme Court orders. In August 2021, federal deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro declared that "a time will come when orders from the highest court, from the most elevated level of our national judiciary, simply won't be obeyed." In June, Ricardo Barros, the government's leader in Congress, made a similar statement: "A time will come when we'll tell the Judiciary that we simply won't comply anymore."
The legal opening they're exploiting traces back to 2013, when the Dilma Rousseff government issued a decree ostensibly to regulate the National Force's role in environmental protection. The decree introduced a contradiction: it said the force "may be employed in any part of the national territory" either by gubernatorial request or by ministerial order. Environmental activists at the time recognized the real purpose—shielding megaprojects like the Belo Monte and Jirau dams from popular protest.
Sergio Moro, as Justice Minister under Bolsonaro, used that loophole in August 2019 to deploy the National Force in Brasília without the Federal District governor's consent. Thousands of students, teachers, and union members had gathered to protest education budget cuts and pension reform. Indigenous women were organizing a separate march to defend their territories. The Federal Public Defender's Office immediately objected, arguing that the National Force cannot serve as an instrument of federal intervention in a state. Later reporting revealed that National Force members had been used to surveil indigenous organizers, including Sônia Guajajara.
A 2020 survey by the Brazilian Public Security Forum found that 41 percent of military police enlisted ranks participated in Bolsonaro-supporting groups on social media, 25 percent embraced radical ideas, and 12 percent openly advocated closing the Supreme Court and Congress. In states governed by Bolsonaro allies, deploying the National Force is simple—the governor consents. Everywhere else, the government is now seriously discussing whether a minister can simply override a governor's refusal. The utility of such a power becomes clear if street-level golpism moves from rhetoric to action.
Citações Notáveis
A time will come when orders from the highest court simply won't be obeyed— Federal Deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, August 2021
A time will come when we'll tell the Judiciary that we simply won't comply anymore— Ricardo Barros, government leader in Congress, June 2021
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why would the government bother with the National Force instead of just using the military directly?
Optics. The military is the nuclear option—it looks like a coup, it feels like a coup. The National Force is dressed up as police work, as law enforcement. It's the same force, but with plausible deniability.
And the Supreme Court has already said this is illegal?
Completely. Nine to one. They ruled it violates the Constitution. But that's the whole point of these discussions—they're talking about doing it anyway.
Who benefits from this? Who would actually be deployed against?
Opposition governors, protest movements, indigenous communities. Anyone organizing against the government in a state where the governor won't cooperate. The timing matters too—they're thinking about 2022, about what happens if the election doesn't go their way.
Is there any chance the courts would stop them?
The courts already have. But Bolsonaro's allies are saying openly they won't listen. That's the real story—not the legal argument, but the willingness to ignore the law entirely.
How much support do they actually have within the police ranks?
Enough to be dangerous. Four in ten military police are in Bolsonaro groups online. A quarter embrace radical ideas. If you're planning something, those numbers matter.
So this is preparation for something specific?
It's preparation for the possibility that Bolsonaro loses and refuses to accept it. Or that he wins and wants to consolidate power. Either way, they're building the legal and political infrastructure to use force without the normal checks.