Israel wants to renew the war, and they're creating the conditions
In the long and fractured history of mediated peace, the danger has rarely been the absence of agreements — it has been the selective telling of who broke them. Before the United Nations in May, the Board of Peace's chief diplomat named Hamas as the sole obstacle to Gaza's ceasefire, while the ground told a more complicated story: expanded Israeli territory, restricted aid, and over 850 Palestinian deaths since October. When an arbiter of peace speaks only half the truth, the silence around the other half becomes its own kind of violence.
- A UN address placed all blame for the stalled Gaza ceasefire on Hamas, but analysts say Israel has violated nearly every major obligation it accepted under the October agreement.
- Since the ceasefire began, Israeli forces have expanded controlled territory from 53% to 60%, killed more than 850 Palestinians, and blocked the humanitarian aid and civilian administrators the deal required.
- Hamas has signaled conditional willingness to disarm — but only if Israel fulfills reciprocal commitments first, a demand the Board of Peace's official report did not acknowledge.
- Twelve Palestinian technocrats chosen to lead Gaza's civilian transition have been stranded in a Cairo hotel for months, barred from entering by Israel despite being central to the peace roadmap.
- Critics warn that by framing Hamas as the sole obstacle, the report hands Netanyahu political cover to declare the ceasefire dead and resume full-scale war — with Hamas disarmed and Israel facing no consequences.
In May, Nickolay Mladenov, the Board of Peace's high representative for Gaza, told the UN Security Council that Hamas was the "principal obstacle" to the ceasefire agreed in October. The militant group, he said, refused to disarm, refused to cede control, refused to allow a civilian transition. It was a clear indictment — and, according to analysts who had studied the actual agreement, a dramatically incomplete one.
The ceasefire had always been fragile. Both sides had made commitments: Israel agreed to allow 600 trucks of humanitarian aid daily and to respect a territorial boundary leaving 53% of Gaza under its control; Hamas agreed to eventually disarm and hand governance to a civilian body. Five months later, Israeli forces had expanded their controlled territory to at least 60%, continued launching airstrikes, killed over 850 Palestinians, and blocked aid — including basic reconstruction materials — on dual-use grounds. None of this appeared in Mladenov's report.
Hamas rejected the accusations as cover for further Israeli military action. But the sharper criticism came from veteran negotiators. Israeli analyst Gershon Baskin said Hamas had signaled readiness to begin disarming — contingent on Israel fulfilling its own obligations in parallel. Muhammad Shehada of the European Council on Foreign Relations was more direct: Israel had not honored phase one of the deal, so why would anyone trust it to honor phase two once Hamas had surrendered its only leverage?
The Board of Peace's disarmament roadmap included a verification committee and a Palestinian civilian body — the NCAG — to oversee the transition. Twelve technocrats had been selected in January and were waiting in Cairo to enter Gaza. Israel refused to let them in, reportedly telling American officials that their presence would mirror Lebanon's fractured governance model. Baskin read the obstruction differently: Israel, he argued, was manufacturing conditions to justify returning to war.
Daniel Levy, a former peace negotiator now heading the US/Middle East Project, said the record was clear — Hamas was prepared to hand over governance, but not to surrender unconditionally. The NCAG members themselves were caught between irrelevance and complicity, with four threatening to resign before Mladenov persuaded them to stay.
What troubled analysts most was the consequence of Mladenov's framing. By assigning sole blame to Hamas, the report offered Netanyahu political cover to declare the ceasefire dead. The deadlock was not the product of one side's refusal to move — it was the product of obligations that had never been symmetrically enforced, and an official process that had stopped pretending otherwise.
In May, the Board of Peace's chief diplomat stood before the United Nations and pointed a single finger. Nickolay Mladenov, the Bulgarian official serving as high representative for Gaza under the Trump administration's peace initiative, told the Security Council that Hamas was the "principal obstacle" blocking the ceasefire that had been in place since October. The militant group, he said, refused to disarm, refused to surrender control, refused to allow a genuine civilian transition. It was a clear indictment. It was also, according to analysts and peace negotiators who have studied the actual terms of the agreement, a dramatically incomplete account of what had gone wrong.
The ceasefire itself had been fragile from the start. When it took effect in October, both sides had made commitments. Israel agreed to allow 600 trucks of humanitarian supplies into Gaza daily and to respect a territorial boundary that left 53 percent of the territory under Israeli control. Hamas agreed to eventually disarm and hand over governance to a civilian administration. But five months in, the picture on the ground told a different story than Mladenov's testimony suggested. Israeli forces had continued launching airstrikes. They had moved their positions forward, expanding their controlled territory from 53 percent to at least 60 percent. They had shot Palestinians who ventured too close to the shifting front line. More than 850 Palestinians had been killed since the ceasefire began. The humanitarian aid that was supposed to flow in—600 trucks a day—had been restricted. Israel had refused to relax controls on what it called "dual-use" items: water pipes, construction equipment, the basic machinery needed to clear rubble and rebuild. None of this appeared in Mladenov's report to the Security Council.
Hamas rejected the accusations immediately. Its spokesperson, Hazem Qassem, said the report simply echoed the Israeli position and served as cover for further Israeli military action. But the real criticism came from people who had spent years negotiating between Israelis and Palestinians. Gershon Baskin, an Israeli analyst involved in back-channel talks, said Hamas had actually signaled willingness to begin disarming—but only if Israel simultaneously fulfilled its own obligations. "Hamas's demand is that it be done in parallel to the commitments that Israel has undertaken and has not fulfilled," Baskin said. Muhammad Shehada, a fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, put it more bluntly: "Israel never fulfilled any of its obligations under phase one of the deal, so why would anyone trust they'd live up to phase two, especially once the weapons—Gaza's only leverage—are gone?"
The Board of Peace had drafted a roadmap for disarmament. It proposed creating a verification committee to oversee the process, with Hamas and other armed groups handing in heavy weapons within 90 days while Israel took reciprocal steps. The plan included a Palestinian civilian administration—the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, or NCAG—that would oversee the transition. Twelve Palestinian technocrats had been selected for this committee in January. They were supposed to enter Gaza from Egypt and begin the handover of power. They were still waiting in a Cairo hotel. Israel had refused to let them in. According to Baskin, Israeli officials told the Americans that allowing the NCAG to enter would create a situation like Lebanon, where an official government would exist but real power would remain with armed groups. "I don't think that's the big problem," Baskin said. "The big problem is that Israel wants to renew the war, and they're creating the conditions where the Israeli public is being pumped every day with stories that Hamas is rebuilding itself, gaining strength. That's a really overblown exaggeration of reality."
Daniel Levy, a British-Israeli former peace negotiator now heading the US/Middle East Project, said the record was clear: Hamas had not rejected disarmament or the transfer of power. "It's well established that they are ready to hand over governance," Levy said. "But they are not going to wave a white flag of surrender." The NCAG members themselves were caught in an impossible position. Four had threatened to resign, believing they had become a distraction that was simply buying Israel time. Mladenov had persuaded them to stay. A source close to the committee acknowledged the bind: their reputation among Palestinians was suffering by association with the Board of Peace, but "if there is any hope of stopping the killing in Gaza, this is the only game in town."
What worried analysts most was what Mladenov's one-sided report might enable. By placing sole blame on Hamas, the high representative had created political cover for Benjamin Netanyahu to declare the ceasefire dead and return to war. If Hamas disarmed without Israel fulfilling its reciprocal commitments, Netanyahu would have removed the only leverage Palestinians possessed and faced no international consequences for walking away. The ceasefire was stalling not because one side refused to move, but because the terms of movement had never been fairly defined—and now the official arbiter of the process was suggesting that only one side bore responsibility for the deadlock.
Notable Quotes
Israel never fulfilled any of its obligations under phase one of the deal, so why would anyone trust they'd live up to phase two, especially once the weapons—Gaza's only leverage—are gone?— Muhammad Shehada, European Council on Foreign Relations
Hamas's demand is that it be done in parallel to the commitments that Israel has undertaken and has not fulfilled.— Gershon Baskin, Israeli analyst
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does it matter what Mladenov said to the Security Council? Isn't that just diplomatic theater?
Because his words shape what comes next. If the international community accepts that Hamas is the sole obstacle, then Netanyahu has permission to restart the war. The ceasefire becomes Hamas's fault, not Israel's.
But Hamas does need to disarm eventually, doesn't it? That's a real requirement.
Yes, but not without guarantees. If you're Hamas and you hand over your weapons while Israel has broken every other promise, you're defenseless. Baskin says Hamas has indicated willingness—but only if Israel moves in parallel, not after.
So the NCAG members stuck in Cairo—are they hostages, or are they just waiting?
They're waiting, but it's a particular kind of waiting. They're supposed to oversee the transition, but Israel won't let them into Gaza. So they attend seminars in a hotel and their credibility erodes. Some want to quit because they realize they're just buying time for Israel.
For what purpose? Why would Israel want to delay?
To rebuild public support for war. Baskin says Israeli media is being fed stories that Hamas is getting stronger, that the threat is growing. It's preparation. If the ceasefire collapses, the Israeli public will believe it had to.
And the 850 Palestinians killed since October—are those ceasefire violations?
That's the question nobody's answering clearly. Israeli forces are still operating, still shooting, still expanding territory. But Mladenov's report doesn't mention any of it. He only criticizes Hamas, by implication.
So what happens if Hamas actually agrees to disarm?
Then they lose their only bargaining chip and Israel can do whatever it wants without international pushback. That's why they won't move first. And that's why the whole thing is stuck.