China is in the background of all of these meetings
On a June morning in Washington, two of the world's largest democracies drew closer together — not without friction, but with unmistakable intent. President Biden welcomed Prime Minister Modi to the White House with the full ceremony of a state visit, the highest diplomatic honor an American president can bestow, signaling that India's role as a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific had become a cornerstone of American foreign policy. Yet the gathering carried a shadow: outside the gates, advocates and lawmakers pressed the administration to reckon with democratic erosion inside India itself, asking whether strategic partnership could coexist with the values it claimed to uphold.
- The White House extended its rarest diplomatic honor to Modi, making unmistakably clear that Washington sees India as indispensable to its strategy against Chinese influence across the Indo-Pacific.
- Protesters and dozens of lawmakers gathered at the margins of the celebration, demanding accountability for Hindu nationalist violence, press crackdowns, and the shrinking of political space under Modi's government.
- The Biden administration spent weeks laying groundwork — defense chiefs and national security advisers traveling to New Delhi — to lock in technology-sharing, arms cooperation, and agreements designed to pull India away from its reliance on Russian weapons.
- India's repeated abstentions on UN votes condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine hung unresolved in the room, with Modi offering only that India stood 'on the side of peace' — a formulation that pleased no one fully.
- The administration settled on a posture of quiet concern over human rights: raising issues privately, avoiding public lectures, and appealing to India's ambitions as a rising global leader rather than confronting its record directly.
- The visit left open the central question neither side could yet answer — whether a partnership built on strategic necessity could honestly carry the weight of democratic values both nations claimed to share.
On a Thursday morning in June, thousands gathered on the White House South Lawn to witness the arrival of Narendra Modi for his first official state visit to the United States. A state visit is the highest diplomatic honor a president can extend, and the symbolism was deliberate: India had become central to Washington's strategy in the Indo-Pacific, valued above all as a counterweight to China.
But the occasion was not without its shadows. Outside the gates, human rights advocates and dozens of lawmakers had spent weeks raising alarms — about Hindu nationalist violence, discrimination against India's Muslim minority, the targeting of journalists, and the narrowing of democratic space. Earlier that year, India had blocked a BBC documentary examining Modi's role in the 2002 Gujarat riots, and when the BBC's Indian offices were subsequently raided by tax officials, few observers missed the implication.
For Biden, the visit demanded a careful balance. His administration had invested heavily in deepening ties — defense secretary Lloyd Austin and national security adviser Jake Sullivan had both traveled to India in recent weeks, and a range of agreements on technology, defense cooperation, and workforce development were on the table. India's own tensions with China along their shared border made the convergence feel genuinely strategic, not merely ceremonial.
Still, the human rights question would not be set aside entirely. Lawmakers pressed Biden to raise concerns directly with Modi in their private meeting. Sullivan offered the administration's measured answer to reporters: when the US saw challenges to press freedom or religious liberty, he said, 'we make our views known' — but without lecturing, and without pretending America's own record was unblemished. It was acknowledgment calibrated to avoid confrontation.
Modi had arrived in New York on Tuesday, led a yoga session at the United Nations, and would go on to address a joint session of Congress before the state dinner. He carried with him India's continued abstentions on UN votes condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine — a stance he described not as neutrality but as standing 'on the side of peace,' a formulation that satisfied no one fully.
Analysts noted that China hovered in the background of every conversation. India was, as one observer put it, 'one of the leading partners' in the administration's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet many in the Indian diaspora had grown quietly disheartened by what they saw happening to democratic institutions at home. The partnership both governments were building was real and substantive — what remained unresolved was whether it could honestly accommodate the tension between strategic interest and the values each side claimed to hold.
On Thursday morning, thousands of people would gather on the White House South Lawn—Indian Americans, diplomats, guests—to witness the arrival of Narendra Modi, India's prime minister since 2014. It was the second day of his first official state visit to the United States, an honor that carries weight. A state visit is the highest diplomatic invitation a president can extend, a signal of where his administration believes the nation's security interests lie. In this case, the message was clear: India matters to Washington, particularly as a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific.
But the ceremony would be shadowed. Outside the White House gates, demonstrators were preparing to gather. Human rights advocates and dozens of lawmakers had spent weeks raising alarms about Modi's record—the rise of Hindu nationalist violence, discrimination against India's Muslim minority, the narrowing of political space, the targeting of journalists and civil society groups. Earlier in the year, India's government had blocked a BBC documentary examining Modi's role in the 2002 anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat, where he served as chief minister. When the BBC's India offices were subsequently raided by tax officials, activists saw it as retaliation. The timing was not lost on anyone.
For Biden, the visit presented a delicate calculation. The administration wanted deeper ties with India—technology sharing, defense cooperation, educational exchanges, agreements that might reduce India's dependence on Russia as an arms supplier. Security officials had spent weeks preparing the ground. Lloyd Austin, the secretary of defense, and Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, had both traveled to India in recent weeks for high-level meetings. Sullivan had even met with Modi to preview the state visit. The convergence was real and strategic: India faced its own tensions with China along their shared border, and the Indo-Pacific had become a region where both nations saw mutual interest.
Yet the human rights question would not disappear. In a letter sent Tuesday, dozens of lawmakers pressed Biden to raise concerns directly with Modi during their private meeting—to speak about the shrinking of political space, religious intolerance, restrictions on press freedom and internet access. Lisa Curtis, a senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, suggested Biden would likely address religious minorities in private but would not make it a public issue. She argued he should appeal to India's aspirations as a global leader while acknowledging that the United States itself was an imperfect democracy.
Jake Sullivan had offered a preview of the administration's approach when speaking to reporters on Wednesday. When the US saw challenges to press freedom or religious liberties, he said, "we make our views known." But the tone mattered. "We do so in a way where we don't seek to lecture or assert that we don't have challenges ourselves." It was a careful formulation—acknowledgment without confrontation, concern without public pressure.
Modi had arrived in New York on Tuesday and spent Wednesday leading a yoga session at the United Nations to mark International Yoga Day. On Thursday, he would address a joint session of Congress, attend a private meeting with Biden, and sit for a state dinner. The agenda included discussion of climate change, workforce development, health security, and the technology agreements that both sides had been negotiating. But Modi also carried with him the weight of India's abstentions on UN votes condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine. When asked about it, he had told the Wall Street Journal that India was not neutral but "on the side of peace," calling for respect for international law and national sovereignty—a position that satisfied neither those who wanted India to condemn Russia nor those who saw India's stance as pragmatic.
Tamanna Salikuddin, director of South Asia programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace, observed that China was present in the background of every conversation. "There is real convergence between the US and India on China," she said. India, she noted, was "one of the leading partners" in the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet she also acknowledged that many members of the Indian diaspora had grown disheartened by what they saw as a weakening of democratic institutions at home. The deepening of security cooperation, though, was expected to be the main focus—the partnership that both sides wanted to build, even if it meant setting aside, or at least managing quietly, the questions about how India governed itself.
This was Modi's third official state visit under Biden's presidency, following those of French President Emmanuel Macron in November 2022 and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol in April. The visit was meant to signal that India was not merely an ally in the formal sense, but a partner—one with whom the United States was building something substantive. What remained to be seen was whether that partnership could accommodate the tensions between strategic interest and the values the administration claimed to champion.
Citações Notáveis
China is in the background of all of these meetings. There is real convergence between the US and India on China.— Tamanna Salikuddin, director of South Asia programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace
Some people say that we are neutral. But we are not neutral. We are on the side of peace.— Narendra Modi, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does Biden need India right now, specifically?
China. India has border tensions with China, and the US wants to build a coalition in the Indo-Pacific that can balance Chinese power. India is a major economy, a nuclear power, and increasingly important to technology and defense cooperation. It's strategic necessity.
But Modi has a human rights problem. Why not just say that publicly?
Because saying it publicly would damage the relationship Biden is trying to build. The administration believes the security partnership is more important right now than public criticism. They'll raise concerns privately, but they won't make a show of it.
Do Indian Americans support Modi?
No. Many in the diaspora are disheartened by what they see as democratic backsliding—the targeting of journalists, the restrictions on press freedom, the rise of Hindu nationalist violence. But they're not the audience for this visit. The audience is strategic partners and defense officials.
What about India's position on Russia and Ukraine?
India has abstained twice on UN votes condemning Russia's invasion. Modi says India is not neutral but "on the side of peace." The US wants to reduce India's dependence on Russia as an arms supplier, which is why technology-sharing agreements are part of the visit.
So Biden is choosing strategy over values?
He's trying to do both—raise concerns privately while deepening the partnership publicly. Whether that's a choice or a balance depends on what you believe is possible in diplomacy.
What happens after Thursday?
The agreements get signed, the relationship deepens, and the human rights questions remain unresolved. India continues to govern as it sees fit, and the US continues to work with it because the alternative—a closer China-India relationship—seems worse.