Economic coercion is the biggest factor damaging perceptions of the United States
For a generation, Southeast Asia accepted a quiet division of loyalties — trading with China while trusting America as the guarantor of its future. That arrangement is now under strain, not because the region has embraced Beijing's vision, but because Washington's turn toward tariffs and economic coercion has made American reliability feel like a diminishing asset. A 2026 survey of regional policymakers marks the second time a majority has expressed preference for alignment with China over the United States, a signal that elite confidence — once eroded slowly — is now moving with purpose.
- For the first time since tracking began, a majority of Southeast Asian policymakers — 52 percent — say they would align with China over the US if forced to choose, a threshold that carries symbolic as much as strategic weight.
- The sharpest wound to American standing is self-inflicted: 43 percent of respondents cite US tariffs and trade coercion as the single greatest factor damaging Washington's credibility in the region.
- China's economic gravity has become structural — nearly $990 billion in ASEAN-China trade in 2024, a newly expanded free trade agreement, and two decades of ports, railways, and 'small and beautiful' development projects woven into regional life.
- US retreats from foreign aid, educational exchanges, and civil society programs have opened precisely the spaces China is now filling with universities, think tanks, health infrastructure, and provincial partnerships.
- The trajectory is not yet irreversible — many states still value the American security role and remain wary of Chinese dominance — but reversing it would require Washington to replace tariff pressure with consistent, predictable economic partnership.
For two decades, Washington operated on a comfortable assumption: Southeast Asia would trade with China out of necessity, but for reassurance about its future, the region would turn to the United States. That calculus is shifting.
A 2026 survey of roughly two thousand Southeast Asian policymakers by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute shows a region growing skeptical of American reliability. Trust in Washington fell during Trump's first term, recovered briefly under Biden, then declined again. By 2026, 52 percent of respondents favored alignment with Beijing over Washington — the second time China has edged ahead, after a brief reversal in 2025 when respondents hoped Trump would take a firmer line on China. Those hopes did not materialize. More than half named Trump's leadership as their top geopolitical concern.
These surveys measure elite sentiment, not irreversible strategic realignment. But elite perceptions shape policy, and the directional signal across multiple years is hard to dismiss. What is driving the shift matters more than whether Southeast Asia is definitively 'choosing' China.
The answer is economic, not security-based. When asked what would most damage their view of the United States, 43 percent pointed to tariffs and trade coercion — the single largest factor eroding American credibility. Meanwhile, ASEAN-China trade reached nearly $990 billion in 2024, and a newly expanded free trade agreement now extends into digital economy, green economy, and supply chain connectivity. US engagement, by contrast, is experienced primarily as pressure.
China's position is reinforced by infrastructure and institutions built over decades — ports, railways, universities, think tanks, health programs, and 'small and beautiful' development projects designed to build local familiarity rather than generate headlines. Indonesia joined BRICS in 2024; Malaysia and Thailand followed as partner countries. These moves reflect long-standing hedging, but Trump's policies have accelerated the impulse toward structural repositioning.
It would be premature to declare Southeast Asia lost to Beijing. The region remains wary of Chinese dominance and values the US security role. But economic coercion has become the primary factor damaging American credibility — and China is benefitting not by winning outright, but by appearing more consistent on the issues that matter most: trade, investment, and predictable engagement. The trajectory remains reversible, but only if Washington replaces tariff pressure with sustained economic and diplomatic partnership.
For two decades, Washington operated on a comfortable assumption: Southeast Asia would trade with China out of necessity, but when the region needed reassurance about its future, it would turn to the United States. That calculus is shifting in ways that are difficult to ignore.
A survey of roughly two thousand Southeast Asian policymakers conducted by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute in 2026 reveals a region increasingly skeptical of American reliability. The data tells a story of eroding confidence that tracks closely with shifts in US policy. Trust in Washington fell sharply during Donald Trump's first presidency, recovered slightly when Joe Biden took office in 2021 and 2022, then declined again in 2023. By 2024, for the first time, more respondents said Southeast Asia should align with China than with the United States if forced to choose. The 2025 survey briefly reversed that trend—respondents hoped Trump would take a harder line on China—but those expectations did not materialize. In 2026, China edged ahead again, with 52 percent favoring alignment with Beijing compared to 48 percent for Washington. More than half of respondents identified Trump's leadership as their top geopolitical concern.
These surveys function as barometers of elite sentiment rather than final verdicts. The year-to-year volatility suggests they capture shifting perceptions among policymakers rather than an irreversible strategic realignment. Yet elite perceptions shape policy decisions, and the directional signal across multiple years is difficult to dismiss. What matters most is not whether Southeast Asia is "choosing" China in any absolute sense, but rather what is driving the shift.
The answer lies less in security calculations than in economics. When asked what would most damage their view of the United States, 43.4 percent of respondents pointed to Washington's use of tariffs and other trade coercion. This is the single largest factor eroding American credibility in the region. Meanwhile, China's economic footprint has become impossible to ignore. In 2024, trade between ASEAN and China reached nearly $990 billion, making China ASEAN's largest trading partner and accounting for one-fifth of the region's total trade. Negotiations on an expanded ASEAN-China Free Trade Area were completed in 2025, extending the agreement into digital economy, green economy, and supply chain connectivity. By contrast, Southeast Asian policymakers see US economic engagement primarily through the lens of tariff threats and pressure.
Geography and infrastructure have embedded China into Southeast Asia's economic future in ways that go beyond trade statistics. Two decades of Chinese investment in ports, railways, and development projects have created networks of interdependence that are difficult to unwind. China's position is reinforced by what it does not do: it offers financing without the governance conditions that Western lenders typically impose. This appeal has driven Southeast Asian states to diversify their external partnerships through platforms like BRICS. Indonesia became the first Southeast Asian member of BRICS in 2024, while Malaysia and Thailand joined as partner countries. These moves reflect a long-standing hedging strategy, but Trump's policies have accelerated the impulse, turning cautious balancing into something closer to structural repositioning.
China appears to understand the regional mood better than Washington. Beijing operates through a dense ecosystem of state, commercial, academic, and institutional networks. It expands ties through universities, think tanks, provincial governments, training programs, and development initiatives. The Health Silk Road has evolved beyond vaccine diplomacy into longer-term health infrastructure development. In Cambodia and elsewhere, Beijing has launched what it calls "small and beautiful" projects—modest, targeted interventions designed to build local familiarity and goodwill rather than generate headlines. These efforts fill spaces where the United States has retreated. Washington once possessed a strong comparative advantage in development assistance, educational exchanges, university partnerships, and civil society engagement. But cuts to foreign aid and exchange programs under Trump have narrowed that advantage precisely when China is broadening its regional presence.
It would be premature to declare Southeast Asia lost to Beijing. Many states, including the Philippines, continue to value the US security role. The region remains wary of Chinese dominance and anxious about Chinese conduct in the South China Sea. But the fact that economic coercion has become the primary factor damaging American credibility reveals where the real vulnerability lies. China is not "winning" the competition in any straightforward sense. Rather, it is benefitting from the United States appearing increasingly unreliable on the issues Southeast Asian states care most about: trade, investment, and predictable engagement. This trajectory remains reversible, but only if Washington fundamentally changes its approach—moving beyond tariffs and strategic competition toward consistent economic and diplomatic partnerships. Otherwise, Southeast Asia will continue preparing for a future in which China is unavoidable and American reliability is uncertain.
Notable Quotes
Washington's use of tariffs and other trade measures was identified as the factor most likely to worsen views of the United States— ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute 2026 survey respondents
Southeast Asian states said ties with the Trump administration could be improved through respect for international law, free trade and strategic partnerships over punitive tariffs— Survey respondents
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does a survey of two thousand policymakers matter more than what ordinary Southeast Asians think?
Because policymakers shape how their countries respond. If your foreign minister believes the US is unreliable, that belief influences trade negotiations, military partnerships, infrastructure decisions. The survey captures the people making those calls.
But you said the survey swings year to year. Doesn't that suggest it's just noise?
It captures real shifts in sentiment, but yes—it's volatile. What matters is the direction. Trust went down under Trump, up briefly under Biden, down again. That pattern tells you something about how Southeast Asia reads American leadership.
So why is China winning if people are still worried about it in the South China Sea?
Because worry about China's behavior doesn't outweigh the logic of economic dependence. You can be anxious about a neighbor and still need to trade with them. Geography and supply chains don't care about your preferences.
The article mentions "small and beautiful" projects. What does that actually mean?
It means China is doing modest, local things—health clinics in villages, training programs, infrastructure that touches people's lives directly. Not grand gestures. It's presence where the US has become absent.
If the US just stopped using tariffs, would that fix it?
It would help, but it's deeper than that. Southeast Asia wants predictable, consistent engagement. Tariffs are the symptom. The disease is that Washington treats the region as a theater for competition rather than as partners with their own interests.
What happens if nothing changes?
Southeast Asia continues hedging, but the hedging becomes less balanced. You get more BRICS membership, more infrastructure tied to China, more decisions made without consulting Washington. Not a dramatic break, but a slow reorientation.