Russia feels it is losing Armenia, and is trying to force a choice
Russia has imposed trade restrictions on Armenian cognac, flowers, and fish to pressure the country away from European integration ahead of Sunday's vote. Armenia's security relationship with Russia fractured after Moscow failed to prevent Azerbaijan's 2023 seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh, prompting Pashinyan to suspend CSTO participation.
- Russia banned imports of Armenian cognac, flowers, and fish last month, citing sanitary concerns widely viewed as political pressure
- Over 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan seized it in 2023, fracturing Armenia's trust in Russian security guarantees
- Pashinyan's Civil Contract party leads polls at roughly 30% ahead of Sunday's election, while the Kremlin-backed opposition candidate trails at 10%
- Armenia sends approximately 40% of its exports to Russia and relies on subsidized Russian gas to underpin its economy
Armenia heads to parliamentary elections Sunday as PM Pashinyan pursues European integration despite Russian pressure, trade bans, and Putin's veiled threats of a 'Ukrainian scenario' for the traditionally allied nation.
At the Abovyan cognac factory on the outskirts of Yerevan, the bottling line moves with practiced urgency. Women in white coats feed bottles onto conveyors, label them, stack them onto pallets, load them into trucks. Seven million bottles a year leave this facility bound for Russia. Or they used to. Last month, Moscow announced it would no longer accept Armenian cognac imports, citing sanitary concerns—a pretext so thin that almost no one believed it. The real message was political: stop tilting toward Europe, or face the consequences.
Armenia is voting on Sunday, and the Kremlin wants a particular outcome. For decades, the country of three million people has been Moscow's closest partner in the South Caucasus, the region that bridges eastern Europe and western Asia. It hosted Russian troops, bought Russian weapons, integrated itself into Kremlin-led structures. But under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power through a popular uprising in 2018, that alignment has begun to crack. Pashinyan is pursuing what amounts to Armenia's most significant foreign policy reorientation since independence in 1991—a pivot toward Europe, toward the United States, away from the gravitational pull of Moscow. Russia is not taking this quietly.
The trade restrictions on cognac are only the most visible pressure. Moscow has also banned Armenian flowers, fish, and fruit. Roughly forty percent of Armenia's exports go to Russia, which means these bans carry real weight. But the Kremlin's messaging has grown sharper and darker. Vladimir Putin warned that Armenia could face a "Ukrainian scenario" if it continued down the European path. Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chair of Russia's security council, hinted that Pashinyan might meet the fate of Leon Trotsky—killed by Stalin with an ice pick. The subtext was unmistakable: abandon this European dream, or face consequences you cannot control.
The rupture between Armenia and Russia accelerated after 2023, when Azerbaijan seized the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. More than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled the enclave. What made this moment a watershed was not the loss itself but Russia's response to it. Despite being bound to Armenia through a security alliance and maintaining peacekeepers in the region, Moscow stood aside. It did nothing. For many Armenians, this exposed the hollowness of Russian security guarantees. Pashinyan suspended Armenia's participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Moscow-led military alliance that had long anchored Armenian security strategy. In April, he hosted a European Political Community summit in Yerevan—with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in attendance, a deliberate affront to the Kremlin.
Meanwhile, the United States has moved in. Donald Trump has publicly endorsed Pashinyan. Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have both visited Yerevan, signaling a level of American political and economic engagement Armenia has never before experienced. Pashinyan speaks openly about Armenia's aspirations to join the European Union, a distant prospect but a real one. He has cultivated particularly close ties with French President Emmanuel Macron—the two even performed together at an official dinner, with Pashinyan on drums as Macron sang.
For Moscow, this represents a loss of influence at a moment when it can least afford one. Four years into the grinding war in Ukraine, the Kremlin is working hard to preserve its dominance across the former Soviet sphere. In Moldova and Hungary, it has tried to bolster friendly political forces through disinformation campaigns and covert influence operations. The same playbook is being deployed in Armenia. Kremlin backing has flowed toward Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire whose Stronger Armenia party advocates closer ties with Moscow. Karapetyan is currently under house arrest on charges related to calls for seizing power. Yet despite all this pressure, opinion polls show Pashinyan's Civil Contract party on course to win roughly thirty percent of the vote, while Karapetyan trails at around ten percent. Analysts suggest the Russian campaign has backfired, actually strengthening Pashinyan by making opposition to him look like opposition to Russian interests.
Pashinyan's campaign centers on what he calls the "crossroads of peace"—a vision of Armenia as a regional transit hub, reconnecting long-closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, moving beyond decades of conflict and isolation. But he has been careful not to frame this as a complete break with Russia. He has made clear that Moscow will keep its large military base in Armenia. He has said he will travel to meet Putin shortly after the elections. He speaks of diversification rather than divorce. "Russia has such dominance that the west is not a peer competitor," according to analysts assessing his realistic position. No one is talking about replacing Russia with France or the United States overnight.
Yet Moscow still holds powerful levers. Russian officials have hinted that Armenia may no longer be able to rely on the subsidized gas that underpins much of its economy. If the Kremlin demands to renegotiate gas prices, that will signal Armenia has pushed too far. The European Union has announced a fifty-million-euro economic support package to help Armenia weather Russian trade pressure, and Ukraine has begun importing Armenian roses following Russia's flower ban. But these gestures, however symbolic, cannot fully offset the economic weight Moscow can bring to bear. Sunday's election will determine whether Pashinyan can hold his course, or whether Russian pressure will force Armenia back into the Kremlin's orbit.
Citas Notables
We just hope this all blows over. All our cognac is sold in Russia, 7m bottles a year. We have nowhere else to go.— Samvel Goroyan, director of Abovyan cognac factory
Moscow feels it is losing Armenia, that the country has got a bit too big for its boots. So Moscow is trying to force Pashinyan to make a choice—for Russia.— Thomas de Waal, senior fellow at Carnegie Europe
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does Russia care so much about Armenia right now? It's a small country.
Because Armenia is proof of concept. If Moscow can't hold its traditional allies, what does that say about Russian power? And Armenia sits in a sensitive region—between Europe and Asia, between NATO-aligned Turkey and the Caucasus. Losing it signals weakness.
But Pashinyan seems to be winning the election anyway. So hasn't the Russian pressure failed?
It's more complicated. The pressure may have backfired domestically—made Pashinyan look like the defender of Armenian independence rather than a Russian puppet. But Russia still has gas, still has the military base, still has economic leverage. This election is just one round.
What does Pashinyan actually want? Is he trying to leave Russia entirely?
No. He's trying to diversify. He wants Europe and America in the mix, but he's not naive about Russian power. He's said he'll keep Moscow's military base, that he'll meet Putin after the election. He's being pragmatic.
And the cognac factory director—what's his actual situation?
He's trapped. Seven million bottles a year went to Russia. Now they can't. He has no alternative market. He's hoping it "blows over," but he knows it might not. That's the real cost of this geopolitical game.
Is there any chance Russia escalates beyond trade bans?
That's the question everyone's asking. If Pashinyan wins and keeps pushing Europe, and if Russia feels truly cornered, the gas subsidies could be cut. That would create a real crisis. But Russia also understands that pushing too hard could push Armenia further away. It's a dangerous balance.