The label opens a door for unilateral American military action
Since returning to office, Donald Trump's administration has designated fourteen Latin American criminal organizations as terrorist groups, with Brazil's powerful PCC and CV factions potentially next on the list. The move carries weight far beyond legal classification — it enables asset freezes, sanctions, and intelligence operations, and historically has preceded American military action on foreign soil. Brazil, watching the sequence that unfolded before the removal of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, fears the designation is less a legal tool than a geopolitical prologue. The friction has already delayed a summit between Presidents Trump and Lula, placing two of the hemisphere's largest nations in an uneasy diplomatic standoff.
- Washington has moved with unusual speed, designating fourteen criminal groups across six Latin American nations since February 2025, with Mexico's six cartels leading the list and Venezuela, Ecuador, Haiti, Colombia, and El Salvador each represented.
- Brazil's PCC and Comando Vermelho are openly named as significant regional threats by the State Department, leaving their formal designation not a question of if, but when.
- Brazilian officials are alarmed not by the label itself but by what it has historically enabled — the Venezuelan precedent showed that terrorist designation of criminal factions preceded U.S. military operations and ultimately the forced removal of Maduro.
- President Lula's planned visit to Washington has been indefinitely postponed, with the terrorist designation framework sitting at the center of a deepening diplomatic rift between Brazil and the United States.
- The designation carries concrete legal teeth — asset freezes, visa bans, financial sanctions, intelligence sharing, and the criminalization of any material support — tools that reshape the operational landscape for both the factions and the governments that host them.
Two of Brazil's most formidable criminal organizations — the Primeiro Comando da Capital and the Comando Vermelho — are watching Washington with growing unease. Since Donald Trump returned to the White House, his State Department has designated fourteen criminal groups across Latin America as terrorist organizations, and Brazilian officials fear their own factions could be next.
The tension has already strained diplomacy. President Lula's planned visit to Washington has been repeatedly postponed with no new date set, and the terrorist designation framework sits at the heart of the friction. When pressed on the PCC and CV, the State Department acknowledged both as significant regional threats while declining to confirm timing — a silence that Brasília reads as deliberate.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has driven the process swiftly. Six Mexican cartels — including Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generación — anchor the list, joined by Venezuela's Tren de Aragua and Cartel de los Soles, and groups from Ecuador, Haiti, El Salvador, and Colombia. Notably, only Ecuador and El Salvador are governed by leaders ideologically aligned with Trump; the others maintain cooperation with Washington while diverging politically.
The practical weight of a terrorist designation is considerable: asset freezes, financial sanctions, visa bans, intelligence sharing, and the criminalization of material support. U.S. law does not explicitly authorize military strikes on this basis alone — but history tells a different story. Trump has launched military operations without congressional or UN authorization, and the Venezuelan sequence is precisely what alarms Brazilian policymakers.
Before U.S. forces moved against Maduro, Washington designated Venezuelan criminal factions as terrorists, positioned ships and aircraft in the Caribbean, and bombed small boats allegedly carrying narcotics. That legal and logistical scaffolding became the foundation for military action that removed a sitting head of state. Brazil is watching that sequence and drawing its own conclusions about what a designation of the PCC or CV might be designed to precede.
Two of Brazil's most powerful criminal organizations are watching Washington closely. The Primeiro Comando da Capital, known as the PCC, and the Comando Vermelho, or CV, have reason to be nervous. Since Donald Trump returned to the White House, his State Department has already designated fourteen criminal groups across Latin America and the Caribbean as terrorist organizations. Brazilian officials fear their own homegrown syndicates could be next—and they're deeply uncomfortable with what that designation might enable.
The tension has become real enough to strain diplomacy. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was supposed to visit Washington this month, but the trip keeps getting postponed, with no new date set. The terrorist labeling sits at the center of the friction. When asked directly about the PCC and CV, the State Department responded that both represent significant threats to regional security. Officials declined to say whether or when the Brazilian factions would receive the formal designation, but the message was clear: it remains under consideration.
Marco Rubio, Trump's Secretary of State, has moved quickly. A Cuban-American Republican with deep roots in Latin American politics, Rubio has overseen the designation of criminal groups from six countries in the region. Mexico accounts for six of the designations—the Sinaloa Cartel, the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel, the Cartel del Noreste, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, the Cartel del Golfo, and Carteles Unidos. Venezuela has two: the Tren de Aragua and the Cartel de los Soles. Ecuador, Haiti, El Salvador, and Colombia each have groups on the list as well. The designations began in February 2025 and have continued steadily through the year.
What makes this pattern politically delicate is whom it aligns with and whom it doesn't. Only Ecuador, under Daniel Noboa, and El Salvador, under Nayib Bukele, have governments ideologically aligned with Trump and considered by Washington as direct partners in fighting transnational organized crime. The others—Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Haiti—maintain some level of cooperation with the United States, but their governments diverge politically from Trump. Noboa and Bukele were among the regional leaders invited to Trump's Shield of the Americas meeting, which focused on combating criminal organizations.
The practical consequences of a terrorist designation are substantial. It enables the freezing of drug trafficking assets, the investigation and monitoring of faction members, the sharing of intelligence between nations, the imposition of financial sanctions, visa bans, and the criminalization of material support—weapons, money, training. While U.S. law does not explicitly authorize military strikes based on such a designation, history shows that organizations labeled as terrorist groups frequently become targets of American military operations outside U.S. territory. Trump has faced criticism for conducting military strikes without seeking congressional approval or authorization from the United Nations Security Council.
Brazil's anxiety is rooted in recent precedent. Before the military operation in Caracas aimed at capturing Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration designated the Venezuelan criminal factions as terrorists. The U.S. Justice Department formally accused Maduro of leading the Cartel de los Soles, though it later retreated from that charge. The drug-trafficking rationale was used to position American ships and aircraft in the Caribbean. U.S. forces bombed small boats allegedly carrying narcotics without demonstrating that those vessels were actually engaged in illegal or violent activity. Those operations then served as a staging ground for the military action that ultimately removed Maduro from power. Brazilian policymakers are watching that sequence unfold and drawing conclusions about what a terrorist designation of the PCC or CV might precede.
Citas Notables
The PCC and CV represent significant threats to regional security— U.S. State Department
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why would Brazil object to the U.S. calling these criminal groups terrorists? Aren't they genuinely dangerous?
They are dangerous—that's not the dispute. Brazil's concern is about what the label enables. It's not about the accuracy of the designation; it's about the door it opens for unilateral American military action without Brazilian consent or international oversight.
So Brazil fears the U.S. might conduct operations on Brazilian soil?
Not necessarily on Brazilian soil directly, but the precedent worries them. Look at what happened with Venezuela. The terrorist designations preceded military operations that toppled a government. Brazil sees the same logic potentially applied to its own criminal organizations.
But the U.S. and Brazil are allies. Would Trump really act without coordination?
That's the uncertainty that's creating the friction. Trump has shown he's willing to act militarily without congressional approval or UN authorization. For Brazil, that unpredictability is the problem, especially when your own criminal groups are being labeled in the same wave.
Why does it matter that only Ecuador and El Salvador are ideologically aligned with Trump?
Because it suggests the designations aren't purely about security threat assessment. If they were, you'd expect more consistency across different political alignments. The pattern suggests alignment with Trump's foreign policy preferences matters as much as the actual criminal activity.
What happens if the PCC and CV get designated?
Immediately, their assets get frozen internationally, their members face visa bans, financial sanctions kick in, and intelligence sharing accelerates. But the real fear is what comes after—whether the U.S. decides military intervention is justified.