The strait is in our hands, we can close it any time we want
In the aftermath of a proposed agreement between Iran and the United States, a fracture has opened within Iran's own political order — one that reveals how deeply the question of sovereignty, sacrifice, and strategic leverage divides a nation shaped by decades of resistance. Government negotiators argue the deal preserves Iran's nuclear flexibility and regional standing, while hardline factions call it a betrayal of everything the country has endured. The dispute, unfolding in parliament, newspapers, and the streets outside the foreign ministry, may ultimately say as much about Iran's internal reckoning as it does about any accord with Washington.
- Hardline MPs and media figures have declared the proposed US deal a 'catastrophic capitulation,' arguing Iran is surrendering its most consequential leverage — control of the Strait of Hormuz — in exchange for promises they believe will never be honored.
- Protests have formed outside Iran's foreign ministry, a social media campaign bearing the hashtag 'we will not accept' is spreading, and senior clerics and parliamentarians are publicly demanding the agreement be rejected.
- Government negotiators are fighting back with detailed defenses: the deal ends regional conflict, defers nuclear restrictions, and preserves Iranian and Omani authority to collect transit fees in the strait — concessions they say Washington resisted fiercely.
- The unresolved fate of roughly $12 billion in frozen Iranian assets and the question of whether Israeli commercial ships may freely transit the strait have become flashpoints that neither side is willing to concede.
- Ironically, the louder the hardline opposition grows, the more it hands Donald Trump a political gift — their fury serving as evidence, however imperfect, that the deal extracts more from Iran than the 2015 nuclear pact ever did.
A fierce argument has broken open inside Iran over whether to accept a proposed deal with the United States. On one side stand the government's negotiators, who believe the agreement serves Iran's interests. On the other stand hardline politicians and media figures who say the terms amount to surrender — that Iran is trading its most powerful leverage for promises that will never materialize.
The core dispute turns on three questions: whether the deal guarantees an end to economic sanctions, whether Iran receives compensation for past damages, and whether Iran retains meaningful control over the Strait of Hormuz. Hardline MP Kamran Ghazanfari flatly rejected claims of victory, while Meysam Nili, who runs Rajanews and was connected to the late president Ebrahim Raisi, called the deal catastrophic and urged Iranians to resist it.
The government's negotiating team, led by Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf and backed by foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, has mounted a detailed defense. Adviser Mehdi Mohammadi argued the deal would end the regional war without imposing new nuclear restrictions on Iran, and that references to 'Iranian arrangements' in the text would allow Iran and Oman to collect transit fees in the strait while barring Israeli military vessels. On the question of frozen assets — roughly $12 billion — he acknowledged terms remained unsettled but said Arab states had committed the funds under pressure of recognizing Iran's regional power.
The hardline opposition has coalesced around the Paydari Front, organizing protests outside the foreign ministry and launching a social media campaign. Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari posed the challenge starkly: if closing the strait had been Iran's most decisive weapon, why surrender it merely for the right to collect passage fees? His letter invoked the deaths of Iran's supreme leader, nuclear scientists, and military commanders, along with hundreds of billions in economic damage. Clerics and MPs have also seized on the prospect of Israeli commercial ships transiting the strait freely, expressing open disbelief.
Government supporters have argued the Paydari Front speaks only for itself, not for ordinary Iranians who understand that wars against superpowers rarely end in total victory. One newspaper complained that hardliners were being given platforms to organize against the deal while its supporters lacked equal opportunity to rally in its favor.
The sharpest irony belongs to Donald Trump. As he faces criticism that he achieved this agreement only through a costly and legally questionable war, the Iranian hardliners' fierce rejection hands him a ready argument — that the deal is tougher than the 2015 pact he withdrew from. The two agreements are fundamentally different in scope, but for a president seeking to justify his approach, the opposition of Iran's own hardliners serves an unexpected purpose.
Inside Iran's government, a fierce argument is breaking open over whether to accept a proposed deal with the United States. On one side stand officials who negotiated the agreement and believe it serves Iran's interests. On the other stand hardline politicians and media figures who say the terms amount to surrender—that Iran is giving away its most powerful leverage for promises that will never materialize.
The core dispute centers on three things: whether the deal guarantees an end to economic sanctions, whether Iran receives compensation for past damages, and whether Iran retains meaningful control over the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most critical shipping lanes. Kamran Ghazanfari, an Iranian MP aligned with the hardline faction, rejected claims of victory outright. "The fact that they say we won and America has retreated is a blatant lie," he said. Meysam Nili, who runs Rajanews and is connected by marriage to the late hardline president Ebrahim Raisi, went further, calling the deal catastrophic and urging Iranians to resist it.
The government's negotiating team, led by Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf with backing from foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, has mounted a detailed defense. Mehdi Mohammadi, an adviser to Ghalibaf, released an audio message laying out their case. The deal, he argued, would end the regional war—including Israeli military operations in Lebanon—without requiring Iran to accept new restrictions on its nuclear program. On the question of uranium disposal, including the process of diluting highly enriched material, those decisions would be deferred to a 60-day negotiation period. Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, Mohammadi said the agreement's reference to "Iranian arrangements" would allow Iran and Oman to collect transit fees and would bar Israeli commercial vessels from passage. He claimed the United States had fought hard to remove that language and only agreed to it in the deal's second phase.
Mohammadi also addressed the frozen Iranian assets held abroad—roughly $12 billion. He acknowledged the final terms had not been settled but said Arab states had committed the funds and were compelled to do so because they recognized Iran's regional power. "The Arab countries have been forced to accept Iran's sovereignty and superiority," he said. On the nuclear question specifically, he noted the agreement contained only a statement that Iran would not build or acquire nuclear weapons—a position Iran has maintained for years. He contrasted this favorably with the 2015 nuclear pact negotiated under Barack Obama, which had required Iran to limit its nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. This time, he argued, Iran retained leverage: "The strait is in our hands, we can close it any time we want at an hour."
The hardline opposition has coalesced around the Paydari Front, a parliamentary faction that includes Mahmoud Nabavian, a national security committee member, and Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the Kayhan newspaper. They have organized protests outside the foreign ministry and launched a social media campaign with the hashtag "we will not accept." Shariatmadari's public letter posed the question directly: if closing the Strait of Hormuz had been a crucial weapon during the recent conflict, why would Iran surrender it merely for the right to collect passage fees? He invoked the deaths of Iran's former supreme leader, nuclear scientists, military commanders, and civilians, along with hundreds of billions in economic damage. "Now by opening the strait of Hormuz and charging service fees from passing ships, we are going to release their economic and commercial bottleneck?" he wrote.
The hardliners have also seized on what they see as a contradiction: the agreement would allow Israeli commercial ships to transit the strait freely. Hajatoleslam Naboyan, a Shia cleric and MP who serves as the Paydari Front's de facto foreign affairs voice, expressed disbelief. "Will Israeli commercial ships also be freed?" he asked. "From now on, all Israeli ships, not military, all hostile countries, their ships and their movement in the strait of Hormuz must be freed."
Government supporters have pushed back, arguing that the Paydari Front opposes any agreement and does not speak for ordinary Iranians, who understand that wars against superpowers rarely end in total victory. The Khorosan newspaper complained that the hardliners were being given a platform to organize against the deal while supporters lacked equal opportunity to rally in its favor. "If the regime is going to grant freedom of speech and assembly to this group so that they can chant slogans against the negotiations, similar freedom must be given to those in favour of the agreement," the paper wrote.
The internal Iranian struggle has an unexpected beneficiary: Donald Trump. As the U.S. president faces criticism that he achieved this agreement only through a costly and legally questionable war—when diplomacy might have sufficed—the Iranian hardliners' fierce rejection provides him with ammunition. He can point to their complaints as evidence that the deal is tougher than the 2015 pact he withdrew from, even though the two agreements are fundamentally different in scope and purpose. The 2015 deal was a detailed arms control accord; this one is focused on ceasefire preconditions. Still, for Trump seeking to justify his approach, the Iranian opposition serves a purpose.
Notable Quotes
The fact that they say we won and America has retreated is a blatant lie— Kamran Ghazanfari, Iranian MP
The Arab countries have been forced to accept Iran's sovereignty and superiority and participate in making concessions— Mehdi Mohammadi, government negotiating team adviser
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why are the hardliners so focused on the Strait of Hormuz? It seems like one detail among many.
Because it's not a detail—it's the only real leverage Iran has left. They used it as a weapon in the recent war. Closing it would have strangled the other side's economy. Now they're being asked to let ships pass through for a fee. To them, that's like trading a gun for pocket change.
But the government says Iran still controls it through these "Iranian arrangements." Isn't that the same thing?
Not really. Control and the right to tax passage are different powers. One is absolute; the other is negotiable. The hardliners see the difference clearly.
What about the nuclear program? That seems like it should matter more.
It does to the negotiators. They're saying Iran kept its flexibility—no new restrictions, just a promise not to build weapons, which Iran has made before. But the hardliners don't trust promises. They want concrete gains, not deferred decisions.
So this is really about whether Iran got enough in return for what it gave up?
Exactly. And there's a deeper question underneath: whether any deal with America is worth making at all. The hardliners seem to believe the answer is no. The government is betting that ending the war is worth the trade-offs.
Does the government actually have the votes to pass this?
That's the real question nobody's answering yet. Right now it's a fight for public opinion and political momentum. Whoever can convince Iranians they won will likely carry the day.