The rapid progress of AI has introduced uncertainty about Microsoft's competitive position
Em um momento em que a inteligência artificial redefine os contornos do poder corporativo, dois dos investidores mais respeitados do mundo olharam para a Microsoft e enxergaram futuros opostos. Bill Ackman apostou na resiliência de um gigante com raízes profundas nos negócios globais, enquanto Christopher Hohn, após uma década de fidelidade, partiu convicto de que a mesma onda tecnológica que a empresa abraçou pode ser aquela que a submergirá. O que está em jogo não é apenas uma ação — é a questão de se os alicerces do software corporativo do século XX podem sustentar o peso da era da IA.
- A Microsoft acumulou uma queda de 25% desde seu pico em julho, criando uma rara janela de entrada para investidores contrários — e uma saída urgente para os que perderam a fé.
- Christopher Hohn liquidou quase oito bilhões de dólares em ações da Microsoft, temendo que agentes de IA possam tornar o Office — a espinha dorsal da empresa por gerações — obsoleto.
- Bill Ackman respondeu ao mesmo cenário com convicção oposta, injetando 2,1 bilhões de dólares e argumentando que o Copilot e o Azure transformam a ameaça da IA em vantagem competitiva.
- A Berkshire Hathaway, sob o novo comando de Greg Abel, triplicou sua posição no Google, sinalizando que o mercado está redistribuindo suas apostas sobre quem serão os verdadeiros vencedores da IA.
- A Microsoft se recuperou 18% desde sua mínima de abril, mas o debate sobre seu fosso competitivo permanece aberto — e o veredicto do mercado, ainda incerto.
Bill Ackman viu uma oportunidade onde outros viam risco. Com as ações da Microsoft negociadas a vinte e uma vezes os lucros futuros — um desconto raro para a empresa — ele construiu uma posição de 2,1 bilhões de dólares na Pershing Square, elevando a Microsoft a quinze por cento do portfólio. A tese era simples e contrária ao consenso: o Office permanece profundamente enraizado nas operações empresariais do mundo inteiro, o Copilot representa uma aposta real na IA produtiva, e o Azure oferece uma vantagem duradoura na nuvem. Para Ackman, a Microsoft de hoje lembrava a Amazon, a Meta e o Google em momentos de dúvida que antecederam grandes valorizações.
Do outro lado da mesa, Christopher Hohn chegou à conclusão oposta. Após quase uma década mantendo a Microsoft em cerca de dez por cento de seu fundo TCI, ele liquidou quase toda a posição de oito bilhões de dólares, reduzindo-a a apenas um por cento. Em carta aos investidores, Hohn foi direto: a velocidade do progresso da IA criou uma incerteza genuína sobre o futuro da franquia de produtividade da empresa. Novos agentes de IA, argumentou ele, poderiam não apenas complementar o Office — poderiam substituí-lo, erguendo plataformas inteiramente novas sobre suas ruínas.
A divergência entre os dois refletiu um debate mais amplo que agitou o setor de tecnologia por meses. A Microsoft havia caído para cerca de 360 dólares em abril antes de se recuperar dezoito por cento, chegando a 423 dólares, com capitalização de mercado de 3,1 trilhões. Para financiar sua entrada na Microsoft, Ackman vendeu sua posição no Google — não por pessimismo em relação à Alphabet, mas por uma escolha de alocação de capital diante de valuations comparativos.
Enquanto isso, a Berkshire Hathaway, agora sob Greg Abel após a aposentadoria de Warren Buffett, mais que triplicou sua posição no Google, acumulando 58 milhões de ações em uma aposta de 16,6 bilhões de dólares. O Gemini estava atraindo usuários do ChatGPT, e as ações da Alphabet subiam 26% no ano. O que emergiu desses movimentos foi um retrato do mundo dos investimentos recalibrando suas apostas — dois investidores inteligentes, a mesma empresa, futuros radicalmente distintos. O mercado, por ora, ainda não decidiu quem está certo.
Bill Ackman saw an opening. Microsoft's stock had fallen roughly a quarter from its peak last July, and the software giant was now trading at twenty-one times forward earnings—a valuation Ackman described as attractive, in line with the broader market and well below what Microsoft had commanded in recent years. He moved decisively, building his Pershing Square position to just over fifteen percent of the fund's portfolio, a stake worth two point one billion dollars by the end of the first quarter. The bet was contrarian, and Ackman knew it.
Christopher Hohn, by contrast, was heading for the exits. The respected manager of TCI Fund Management had held a significant stake in Microsoft for nearly a decade, keeping it around ten percent of his portfolio. But he had grown convinced that artificial intelligence posed a fundamental threat to the company's future. In recent weeks, Hohn liquidated almost his entire eight-billion-dollar position, cutting it down to just one percent of his holdings. In a letter to his investors, he explained his reasoning with precision: the rapid progress of AI had introduced uncertainty about Microsoft's competitive position. He was worried, above all, about the Office franchise—the productivity software that had been Microsoft's foundation for generations. New AI agents, he believed, could reshape how people worked and spawn entirely new platforms to replace it.
The divergence between these two seasoned investors captured a fundamental disagreement about Microsoft's future that had roiled the tech sector for months. The company had been battered by fears that startups like Anthropic and OpenAI would capture the market for AI services, leaving traditional software companies behind. Microsoft's stock had hit a low of just under three hundred sixty dollars in April before recovering eighteen percent to four hundred twenty-three dollars. The company's market capitalization now stood at three point one trillion dollars.
Ackman's thesis rested on the staying power of Microsoft's existing moat. Office remained deeply embedded in how businesses operated around the world. It was not easily displaced. Beyond that, Ackman was encouraged by Microsoft's own AI strategy—specifically the rollout of Copilot, an AI assistant the company had woven directly into its productivity suite, M365. CEO Satya Nadella was personally driving the effort. Ackman also pointed to Azure, Microsoft's cloud service, as a source of durable competitive advantage. He framed the investment as similar to bets Pershing Square had made years earlier on Amazon, Meta, and Alphabet—companies that had faced skepticism but ultimately proved their resilience.
To fund the Microsoft position, Ackman had liquidated Pershing Square's stake in Alphabet. But he was careful to clarify that this was not a bearish call on Google. He remained optimistic about the search giant's long-term prospects. The sale was simply a matter of capital allocation: given current valuations and his limited pool of capital, he had chosen to redeploy the Alphabet proceeds into Microsoft.
Meanwhile, Berkshire Hathaway was moving in the opposite direction. Under the leadership of new CEO Greg Abel, following Warren Buffett's retirement, the conglomerate had more than tripled its Alphabet position. Berkshire now held fifty-eight million shares of Google's parent company—a two hundred twenty-four percent increase from December—making it the seventh-largest position in the portfolio, worth sixteen point six billion dollars. Google, which had seemed vulnerable to AI disruption not long ago, was increasingly being recognized as one of the sector's winners. Its Gemini AI tool was drawing users away from OpenAI's ChatGPT. Alphabet's stock had climbed twenty-six percent so far in the year and had gained one hundred thirty-six percent over the past twelve months. The company was trading at roughly twenty-nine times earnings, and its market capitalization was approaching five trillion dollars, second only to Nvidia's five point three trillion.
What emerged from these moves was a portrait of the investment world recalibrating its bets on artificial intelligence and the tech giants. Hohn's exit from Microsoft and Ackman's entry represented a genuine fork in the road—two intelligent investors looking at the same company and seeing fundamentally different futures. The market would eventually render its verdict, but for now, the disagreement remained unresolved, a reminder that even in an age of data and analysis, conviction about the future remained a matter of judgment.
Notable Quotes
We reduced our Microsoft investment because rapid AI progress brings uncertainty about its competitive position in the future. We are mainly concerned with the Office franchise.— Christopher Hohn, TCI Fund Management
We opened our position at 21x forward earnings, in line with market multiples and well below Microsoft's historical average. We are excited to see Microsoft prioritizing R&D and investing in Copilot.— Bill Ackman, Pershing Square
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why did Hohn decide to sell now, after holding Microsoft for a decade? What changed?
He became convinced that AI agents from startups would disrupt Microsoft's core business—not the company as a whole, but specifically the Office franchise that has been its foundation. He saw new productivity platforms emerging that could replace what Office does.
And Ackman thinks that's wrong?
Ackman thinks the pessimism is overdone. Office is embedded in how millions of businesses actually work. It has a moat—it's not easily ripped out. And Microsoft isn't sitting still. They're building Copilot directly into their products, and Nadella is personally overseeing it.
So this is really about whether Microsoft can adapt fast enough?
Partly that. But it's also about whether the threat is real or exaggerated. Hohn sees existential risk. Ackman sees a temporary repricing of a company with durable competitive advantages.
What's interesting is that Berkshire is doing something similar to Ackman, but with Google instead.
Right. Berkshire tripled its Alphabet position while Ackman was selling Google to buy Microsoft. But they're both making the same kind of bet—that the market has overshot on AI disruption fears, and that the big tech companies will figure out how to integrate AI into their existing businesses.
Do you think one of them will be proven right?
Eventually, yes. But the timeline matters enormously. Hohn might be right that Office faces real pressure over five or ten years. Ackman might be right that the moat holds for long enough that Microsoft captures the upside. They're not necessarily contradicting each other—they're just disagreeing on the speed of change.